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The movement of mass tort litigation into the bankruptcy courts has
opened a new arena whereby a Chapter 11 reorganization not only
discharges mass tort claims, but it also serves as a vehicle to
organize consensual settlement and administer compensation to tort
claimants. The Johns-Manville and the A.H. Robins cases repre-
sent two instances where the bankruptcy courts undertook this new
role. The successes and failure of these efforts bear careful study
as we focus on varying means for handling mass torts.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Today's technology supplies new and convenient consumer products,
but experience may reveal that use of or exposure to these products causes
latent injury or disease.2 Inevitably, as injuries and diseases become
manifest, the news is widely published, and manufacturers of these products
may find themselves overwhelmed with lawsuits for personal injury. Other
persons not yet ill or injured stand vigilant and frightened on the sidelines.
1. William H. Rehnquist, Remarks to the Annual Spring Meeting of the American
Bankruptcy Institute (May 18, 1992).
2. It may take years for medical science to discover the risks associated with
technological advances, see Steven J. Parent, Note, Judicial Creativity in Dealing With
Mass Torts in Bankruptcy, GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 381, 381-82 (1990), or for
government agencies to review the possible health effects of chemicals used in the
marketplace. See Jim Morris et al., The Cancer on Our Coast: We Can't Continue to
Ignore it, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 24, 1991, at 1. Thus, the next so-called mass tort could
arise from any one of many sources. See, e.g., Charlotte Sutton, Silicone Breast
Implants/A Lingering Ordeal, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Sept. 20, 1992, at IF (noting that
substantial litigation has already been initiated in connection with breast implants); Breast
Implants Found to Cause a Variety of Ills, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 19, 1990, at 57
(discussing health risks related to silicone breast implants); Leslie Berkman, The Silicone
Controversy, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1990, at El (same); Julie Hanna, Electric Dangers
Cause Worry, Cfu. TRIB., Oct. 18, 1992, at D3 (discussing health risks associated with
electromagnetic fields emanating from high tension wires).
[Vol. 44:745
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/5
DISCHARGE OF FUTURE CLAIMS
Still others remain unaware that their use of or exposure to these products
has placed them in danger. The resulting crescendo of personal injury claims
and lawsuits, magnified greatly by awards for punitive damages if the
manufacturer is found culpable, threatens an inexorable slide into insolven-
cy.
3
Since 1982, the A.H. Robins Company, Inc., a pharmaceutical
company,4 the Johns-Manville Corporation,5 and at least fourteen other
former asbestos manufacturers have filed for bankruptcy protection.6 The
3. For a detailed discussion of potential operational problems faced by companies
besieged with massive future claims, see Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84
COLUM. L. REv. 846, 856-62 (1984). As Mr. Roe recognizes, a company faced with
overwhelming unresolved claims is likely to suffer an operational collapse as a result of:
(1) blocked or diminished access to capital markets and foregone long-term projects or
other business opportunities; (2) slow liquidation due to rapid maturing of claims (i.e.,
a reduction in operations and asset sales in order for current stockholders to receive
dividends before an inevitable reorganization); (3) stockholder inducement to follow high-
risk strategies in an effort to acquire higher present return; (4) an uncertainty in financial
health that undermines or destroys supplier-customer relations; (5) barriers to worthwhile
mergers; and (6) the diversion or misdirection of managerial energy. Id.
Mr. Roe persuasively argues that the early reorganization of a company faced with
future claims greatly in excess of its assets benefits all interested parties, including future
claimants. Id. at 862-63. Further, he argues that the compensation of future claimants can
best be accomplished through the establishment of a variable annuity fund. Id. at 862-92.
Although his article was published more than nine years ago, before many mass tort-
related bankruptcy decisions, much of Mr. Roe's analysis still holds true.
4. The A.H. Robins Company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy relief in August 1985
as a result of an "avalanche" of personal injury suits related to the Dalkon Shield. See
A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 996 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 876
(1986).
5. Similarly, the Johns-Manville Corporation filed for bankruptcy relief on August
26, 1982 as a result of a "litigation explosion" of cases filed by persons claiming they
were injured by asbestos. See Johns-Manville Corp. v. Asbestos Litig. Group (In re
Johns-Manville Corp.), 40 B.R. 219, 221 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
6. A summary of the status of all recent or current asbestos-related bankruptcy
proceedings as of mid-August 1992, as well as a survey of relevant law as of that date
can be found in Celotex Corp. & Carey Canada, Inc., Report Concerning Claims
Resolution Procedures (Aug. 14, 1992) (hereinafter Celotex Report). This report,
prepared by the debtors' counsel, provided background information and source material
for this Article with respect to the experience with mass torts of the following companies:
UNR Industries, Inc. et al. (UNR); Johns-Manville Corporation (Manville); Amatex
Corporation (Amatex); Forty-EightInsulations, Inc. (Forty-Eight Insulations); Pacor, Inc.
(Pacor), Standard Insulations, Inc. (Standard Insulations); Nicolet, Inc. (Nicolet);
Raymark Industries Inc. (Raymark); Raytech Corporation (Raytech); Hillsborough
Holding Corp. (Hillsborough); The Celotex Corporation (Celotex); Carey Canada (Carey
Canada); National Gypsum Company (National Gypsum); Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc.
(Eagle-Picher); and H.K. Porter Company, Inc. (H.K. Porter). The terms "A.H. Robins"
1993]
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A.H. Robins Company manufactured an intrauterine device known as the
Dalkon Shield, which was found to cause a variety of serious injuries,
including sterility, in many of the approximately 3.6 million women
throughout the world who used it.7 Asbestos fibers, originally used for
years as fire-proof insulation material, and the asbestos dust released during
production were found to cause asbestosis, mesothelioma, cancer, and other
diseases. Moreover, as found by a number of juries, these companies were
not forthright about the dangers associated with their products.8
It is apparent that the manner in which the A.H. Robins and Manville
cases were, or ultimately will be, resolved will greatly affect incipient mass
tort cases. It is also apparent that concerned litigants inquire with particular
interest into the successes and failures of these most prominent of mass tort
bankruptcies. This inquiry reveals that the A.H. Robins court faced the more
manageable task, and that the Manville plan suffers presently from the
greater turmoil and from, at least partial, failure.9
Of more relevance to this Article, however, this inquiry reveals that the
A.H. Robins and Manville cases represent divergent methods of addressing
the problems raised by mass torts in the bankruptcy context. In A.H. Robins,
so-called future claims 10 were discharged except insofar as they were to be
and "Manville" are italicized in the text when they refer to their bankruptcy cases.
Medical problems allegedly caused by silicone breast implants have also precipitated
recent Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings. See, e.g., Petition of Bio-Manufacturing, Inc., No.
93-42603 (Bankr. D. Minn. filed Apr. 29, 1993); Petition of Bioplasty Inc., Bio-
Manufacturing Inc., and Uroplasty Inc., No. 93-42600 (Bankr. D. Minn. filed Apr. 29,
1993); cf In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liability Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1098
(J.P.M.L. 1992).
7. See Georgene M. Vairo, Essay, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust. Paradigm
Lost (or Found)?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 617, 625 (1992) (listing the following injuries
linked to the Dalkon Shield: unwanted pregnancies, ectopic pregnancies, septic abortions,
miscarriages, birth defects caused by presence of Dalkon Shield in women's uteruses
during conception, excessive bleeding and cramping, Pelvic Inflammatory Disease (PID),
and the complications of PID, such as sterilization and infertility).
8. See generally John D. Ayer, Down Bankruptcy Lane, 90 MICH. L. Rv. 1584,
1597 (1992) (book review) (noting culpability of A.H. Robins, Johns-Manville, and other
asbestos companies); Vairo, supra note 7, at 626-27 (noting that A.H. Robins and its
insurers had been accused of misrepresentations and nondisclosures about the dangers of
the Dalkon Shield); EdmundJ. Ferdinand, III, Comment, AsbestosRevisited" Lead-Based
Paint Toxic TortLitigation in the 1990s, 5 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 581, 582 (1992) (discussing
asbestos manufacturers' general "policy of silence," as well as their manipulation of
workers' compensation system, in an effort to conceal information about asbestos dangers
from workers and the public and to avoid tort liability).
9. See Findley v. Blinken (In re Joint E.& S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710
(E.& S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992), modified on reh'g, 993
F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993).
10. The term "future claim" as used in this Article is defined infra note 13 and
[Vol. 44:745
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paid by the personal injury trusts established under the plan of reorganiza-
tion. In Manville, future claims were channeled by injunction to the
established personal injury trusts for payment.
The practical result intended by both methods, however, was the same:
Both sought to provide for the payment of all future claims from a trust
corpus while depriving all claimants of any remedy against the debtors or
their successors, thereby maximizing the going concern value of the estate
and its resulting value to claimants. The Manville method in particular
reflects a profound judicial reluctance to decide the constitutional limitations
on the treatment of future claims." The future claims are channeled
because it is the pragmatic solution to an intractable problem. Notably, years
after the Manville reorganization, the courts generally follow the cautious
Manville approach: Although recognizing the statutory and due process
issues raised by the discharge of future claims, the courts often leave these
issues for another day by issuing a channeling injunction.
It is evident that a channeling injunction, like a discharge, is intended
to circumscribe the rights of future claimants; therefore, a court obliquely
decides the constitutional issues and effects a discharge when it issues such
an injunction. It is worthwhile to examine head-on the constitutional
underpinnings for the discharge of future claims. The topical debate over
present and proposed statutory authority for the channeling and discharge of
future claims begs an analysis of the constitutional authority for such an ap-
proach. 2
II. THE IMPETUS TO DISCHARGE FUTURE CLAIMS
Future personal injury claims arise when a latency period exists
between the use of, or exposure to, a faulty product or toxic substance and
the manifestation of an injury or disease. Thus, for purposes of this Article,
accompanying text.
11. The Manville channeling injunction also reflects an ambivalence about whether
there is statutory authority to discharge future claims. This Article focuses, however, on
the constitutional issues.
12. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Reform Circa 1993: A Presentation of the National
Bankruptcy Conference's Code Review Project, June 11-12, 1993, Chapter 11, T.1.-
T.7. The National Bankruptcy Conference is a voluntary organization composed of
persons interested in the improvement of the Bankruptcy Code and its administration.
Conferees include bankruptcy attorneys, law professors, and judges. The American
Bankruptcy Institute, also a voluntary organization of persons interested in bankruptcy
issues, has proposed its own solution to the asbestos mass tort problem, in particular in
the form of an amendment to the Bankruptcy Code to be known as "Chapter 14."
Although Mr. Mabey is a member of both organizations, the views expressed in this
Article are solely those of the authors.
1993]
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a "future claim" means a claim against a debtor for an injury or disease that
has not yet become manifest at the time the debtor has filed for bankruptcy,
but is based upon the occurrence, prior to the bankruptcy, of one or more
material events, acts, or failures to act.'3 The holder of a future claim will
be referred to as a "future claimant."
On the surface, the dischargeability of future claims through regular
bankruptcy procedures depends only upon their definitional classification
under the Bankruptcy Code.' 4 Under Chapter 11 of the Code, a debtor is
discharged from liability on claims upon confirmation of its plan of
reorganization. 'I Notwithstanding the Code's broad definition of "claim"
to include any "right to payment, whether or not. . . liquidated, ...
contingent . . . [or] matured,"16 and a legislative history that reflects
13. As one commentator has recognized:
Generally .... future claims ariseo from liabilities which possess a common
fact pattern or have as their nexus a common act or omission of the debtor
such as the manufacture of a defective product .... The damage caused by
these acts or omissions is unknown generally at the time of commission but
causes injury to the public on a massive scale with the harm manifesting itself
over a period of years.
Richard L. Epling, Separate Classification of Future Contingent and Unliquidated Claims
in Chapter 11, 6 BANKR. DEv. J. 173 (1989).
Epling distinguishes future claims arising in the ordinary mass tort situation from
those arising from what he labels "toxic torts." Toxic torts "arise from the acts of an
industrial or environmental polluter ... [and may result in] cleanup costs or penalty
fines." Id. Although the term "toxic tort" could be more broadly defined to encompass
personal injury claims in the ordinary mass tort context, Epling makes an apt distinction
between ordinary mass torts and those that also cause environmental damage. Issues of
cleanup and continuing violations that are well beyond the scope of ordinary mass torts
complicate the treatment of future claims in the environmental context. See generally
Thomas G. Gruenert, Environmental Claims in Bankruptcy: Policy Conflicts, Procedural
Piffalls and Problematic Precedent, 32 S. TFX. L. REv. 399 (1991). A discussion of
these issues is beyond the scope of this Article.
14. In this Article, the terms "Bankruptcy Code" and "Code" refer to the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. §§101-1330 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
15. 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (1988). Section 1141 uses the term "debt," which means
liability on a claim. See id. § 101(12) (Supp. IV 1992).
16. In full, § 101(5) of the Bankruptcy Code defines "claim" to mean:
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed,
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
03) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach
gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable
remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured,
disputed, undisputed, secured or unsecured.
Id. 101(5) (Supp. IV 1992). The term "creditor" is defined, in relevant part, as an
[Vol. 44:745750
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Congress's intention to give the term as expansive a meaning as possible, 7
controversy has followed this definition. Courts and commentators have
debated whether a future claimant's "right to payment" (or "claim") can
already exist under the Code when, under state tort laws, the claim may not
arise until an injury becomes manifest.
18
Neither the A.H. Robins court nor the Manville court specifically ruled
whether future claims qualify as claims complete with the concomitant
discharge.19 Moreover, recent case law in the mass tort area generally
"entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order
for relief concerning the debtor." See id. § 101(10)(A).
17. "By this broadest possible definition [of a claim, the Code] contemplates that all
legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, will be able to be
dealt with in the bankruptcy case. It permits the broadestpossible relief in the bankruptcy
court." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. 309 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6266 (emphasis added); see also S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 21-22 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5807-08.
18. See, e.g., Harvey J. Kesner, Future Asbestos Related Litigants as Holders of
Statutory Claims Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and Their Place in the Johns-
Manville Reorganization, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 69 (1988) (arguing that future asbestos
litigants should be treated as statutory claimants under the Bankruptcy Code); Gregory
A. Bibler, The Status of Unaccrued Tort Claims in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Proceedings,
61 AM. BANKR. L.J. 145 (1987) (arguing that future claims cannot be treated as "claims"
under the Bankruptcy Code); Roe, supra note 3, at 893-98 (arguing that Bankruptcy
Code, as drafted, could be interpreted to permit the pooling and resolution of future
claims in an early reorganization); see also Anne Hardiman, Note, Toxic Torts and
Chapter 11 Reorganization: The Problem of Future Claims, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1369,
1377 (1985) (suggesting that bankruptcy courts should use their equitable powers "to
recognize the existence of claims for bankruptcy purposes regardless of the status of the
claims under state law").
It is not the purpose of this Article to rejoin the debate. See Ralph R. Mabey &
Annette W. Jarvis, In re Frenville: A Critique by the National Bankruptcy Conference's
Committee on Claims and Distributions, 42 Bus. LAw. 697 (1987). Rather, we will
presume that the Code definition of "claim" includes future claims, and we will discuss
the constitutional implications of that presumption. We note, however, that commentators
have often suggested the need for a clarifying statutory change. See, e.g., Epling, supra
note 13, at 190; see also Roe, supra note 3, at 917-20.
19. In A.H. Robins, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that a Dalkon
Shield injury that manifested itself postpetition as a result of a prepetition insertion
qualified as a claim under the Bankruptcy Code for purposes of being subject to the
Code's automatic stay provision. Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198, 203 (4th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 487 U.S. 1260 (1988). The court expressly avoided deciding
whether the relevant future claims were dischargeable, but the statutory implication of
dischargeability from that decision seems unavoidable. See id.
In Manville, the bankruptcy court concluded that it need not answer the question
of whether future claimants held cognizable (and thus, dischargeable) claims in order to
confirm the plan of reorganization. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 629
19931
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confirms that whether future claims are cognizable as dischargeable claims
under the Code remains unresolved.2" More important, after over ten years
of debate, the case law reveals that the problem of future claims is more
than definitional. It reflects the tension between constitutionally mandated
due process and a court's constitutionally granted authority under the
Bankruptcy Code to award a fresh start.2
When mass tort-related litigation, characterized by overwhelming future
claims, impels a company to file for reorganization, the company clearly
wants future claims to be cognizable as dischargeable claims under the
Code. Discharge stems the onslaught of debilitating tort litigation against the
reorganized company and thus preserves the going concern value of the
business.' The preservation of going concern value may, in turn, give
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 78 B.R. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1987),
aff'd sub nom. Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988).
20. Compare In re Eagle-Picher Indus., 144 B.R. 69, 71 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992)
(defining "future claimant" in asbestos case as person who does not have a claim under
§ 101(5) of the Code) with Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Aguiar (In re Waterman S.S.
Corp.), 141 B.R. 552, 556 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (determining that asbestos-related
disease resulting from prepetition exposure but manifesting itself postpetition gave rise
to cognizable prepetition claim under § 101(5) of Code), vacated, 157 B.R. 220
(S.D.N.Y. 1993); see also Pettibone v. Ramirez (In re Pettibone Corp.), 90 B.R. 918,
928 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988) (noting that major cases have not reached a decision on
status of future claims).
21. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. According to the Supreme Court:
[A] central purpose of the Code is to provide a procedure by which certain
insolvent debtors can reorder their affairs, make peace with their creditors,
and enjoy "a new opportunity in life with a clear field for future effort,
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt."
Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292
U.S. 234, 244 (1934)); see also H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 17, at 180, reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6141 ("The proposed law will permit a complete settlement
of the affairs of a bankrupt debtor, and a complete discharge and fresh start."); Kesner,
supra note 18, at 86 (stating that fresh start theory is the "cornerstone of the Code in
support of the broad jurisdiction vested in the bankruptcy proceeding").
22. In the Amatex case, however, the bankruptcy and district courts rejected the
debtor's argument that its ability to reorganize and survive was dependent on its ability
to discharge future claims through its plan of reorganization. See In re Amatex Corp.,
37 B.R. 613, 614 (E.D. Pa. 1983), rev'd, 755 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1985) (denying
appointment of guardian ad litem). But cf. In re UNR Indus., 725 F.2d 1111, 1120 (7th
Cir. 1984) (noting, in dictum, that dischargeability of future claims might affect debtor's
ability to emerge from bankruptcy with reasonable prospects for continued existence).
While the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in the Amatex case eventually reversed the
lower courts' decision to deny appointment of a legal representative, it left open the
question of whether future claims qualify as dischargeable claims under the Bankruptcy
Code. See Amatex, 755 F.2d at 1043.
[Vol. 44:745
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present creditors the incentive to allow a debtor's reorganization in the first
place.23 Without the possibility of preserving going concern value, the
present creditors may do better to force a liquidation and divide the current
value of the company among themselves before future claims become
cognizable. Under a liquidation, if future claims do not qualify as discharge-
able claims, future claimants are likely to receive nothing in the bankrupt-
cy.
24
In the H.K. Porter Chapter 11 liquidation case, for example, the
number of future asbestos claimants probably exceeds the number of present
claimants.25 Nevertheless, a liquidation plan proposed by the unsecured
creditors' committee, which established a trust to provide for pro rata
payment to all unsecured creditors including present asbestos claimants,
originally made no provision for future asbestos claimants because the
committee argued that future claims are not claims under the Bankruptcy
Code.26 This result appears to defeat both the principle of injury compensa-
23. For an analysis of the underlying economic considerations, see Roe, supra note
3, at 850-62.
24. See Hardiman, supra note 18, at 1391 (noting that liquidation can prevent a
debtor corporation from compensating all tort victims); Roe, supra note 3, at 848 (stating
that "failure to reorganize early could cripple the firm and leave later tort victims with
empty claims against a corporate charter").
25. See CELOTEx REPORT, supra note 6, at 21 n.48, 87 n.270 (discussing Telephone
Interview with Philip E. Beard, II, Esq., counsel for H.K. Porter (July 27, 1992)).
26. See id. (citing H.K. Porter Disclosure Statement, at 21). The District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania adopted this argument in dicta when it upheld the
H.K. Porter bankruptcy court's decision to deny a motion (made by a member of the
unsecured creditors' committee) for the appointment of a future claims representative.
See Locks v. United States Trustee, 157 B.R. 89, 97 (W.D. Pa. 1993). Moreover, in
concluding that the bankruptcy court had discretion to deny such appointment on conflict
of interest grounds, the district court apparently accepted the argument made by both the
committee and the debtor that the costliness of providing for future claimants through
representation and fund administration would inequitably diminish the value of the
liquidating estate for present creditors and tort claimants. See id. at 99. But cf. In re
Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 58 B.R. 476,477 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986) (appointing legal
representative for future asbestos-related claimants in Chapter 11 liquidation and stating,
in dictum that "it would be highly inequitable to distribute the liquidated assets of the
debtor to the currently known plaintiffs to the detriment of the potential claimants merely
because the potential claimants have not yet manifested an injury").
The H.K. Porter case did not end with the district court's decision. Subsequent to
the bankruptcy court's original decision to deny the motion for appointment of a claims
representative on conflict of interest grounds, and prior to the district court's affirmance
of that decision, the bankruptcy court ruled, in contrast to the district court's dicta, that
the liquidation plan could not be confirmed without making provision for future
claimants. See In re H.K. Porter Co., 156 B.R. 16 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993). In this July
7 decision, the bankruptcy court further ruled that the appointment of a representative
19931
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tion underlying tort law and the fresh start principle of bankruptcy law.27
The preservation of going concern value ordinarily enlarges distributable
value and thus helps to ensure that future claimants can be paid.2"
Affording a company a fresh start assists future claimants, however,
only if they are made aware of the case, provided with an opportunity to
participate in it, and allocated their fair share of the estate value. A
bankruptcy court will normally set a bar date for the filing of claims against
a debtor's estate and require a debtor to notify all potential claimants of the
bar date through reasonable notice procedures.29 The court can then receive
the input of any claimant into the reorganization process, allow or disallow
any claim, and estimate any contingent or unliquidated claims for purposes
of voting, distribution, and ultimate discharge pursuant to Code proce-
dures." Fitting future claims resulting from a mass tort within these
regular procedures raises significant questions of due process: Is it possible
to devise a notice procedure reasonably calculated to reach all future claim-
ants? If not, is there some other way to assure future claimants their due
process rights to participate in the reorganization? A.H. Robins and Manville
was necessary to protect the interests of future claimants and ordered the representative's
appointment. See id. In order to obtain a final and binding determination on the future
claims issue, the Committee moved for, and obtained, the appointment of a future claims
representative, and the debtor filed a declaratory judgment action against the representa-
tive seeking a holding that future claimants are not "creditors" within the meaning of §
101(10) of the Bankruptcy Code. The Committee's Second Amended Disclosure
Statement describes a plan that treats the issue of future claimants in the alternative,
depending upon the outcome of the declaratory judgment action. At this writing, the
bankruptcy court has not resolved this issue. Telephone Interview with Philip E. Beard,
II, Esq., counsel for H.K. Porter (Mar. 8, 1994).
27. As one commentator has noted:
To the extent that tort law is concerned with the injured party, and the injured
party is concerned with an injurer's financial viability, bankruptcy law and
tort law may operate harmoniously. Both bodies of law are, then, inherently
concerned with social costs and benefits. This suggests a strong economic
compatibility between the underlying values of bankruptcy and tort law.
Parent, supra note 2, at 390; see also Hardiman, supra note 18, at 1391-92 (suggesting
that bankruptcy reorganization that incorporates interests of future claimants via
representation serves the tort law goals of compensation and risk allocation); Epling,
supra note 13, at 173-74 (noting that Chapter 11 reorganization stops the "'race to the
courthouse' where the early victims whose injuries have manifested themselves are paid
in full while later claimants receive nothing after all the debtor's assets have been
exhausted").
28. See generally Roe, supra note 3; see also Epling, supra note 13, at 173-74.
29. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(a) (1988); FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002, 3003. In Chapter 11,
certain liquidated claims are deemed filed without action by the claimant, see 11 U.S.C.
§ l11(a), but future claims are unliquidated.
30. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(c).
[Vol. 44:745
10
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss4/5
DISCHARGE OF FUTURE CLAIMS
provide the most prominent, although problematic, answers to these
questions.
Ill. BELTS AND SUSPENDERS: A.H. ROBINS VS. JOHNS-MANVILLE
The A.H. Robins and Manville courts created different models for the
treatment of future claims. In A.H. Robins, the court used both a belt and
suspenders to discharge future claims. It entered an order approximately
three months after the debtor's bankruptcy filing ("Robins Bar Date
Order"), 31 which set a claims bar date ("Robins Bar Date"), established the
form of notice to be given to potential Dalkon Shield claimants (among
others), and created a procedure by which Robins would disseminate the
information world-wide.32 The court also established an uncomplicated
procedure by which a Dalkon Shield claimant was to file a claim.33 The
Robins Bar Date Order, in conjunction with a plan of reorganization under
which all Dalkon Shield claims "heretofore, now or hereafter asserted"
34
were said to be discharged, 35 prevented Dalkon Shield claimants from
bringing suits against anyone other than the established personal injury
31. Upon motion by Robins's counsel and after a hearing, the A.H. Robins court, on
November 21, 1985, vacated its earlier bar date order of November 13 in order to
incorporate requested claims objection procedures, among other things, in its later order.
In this Article, we discuss the November 21, 1985, Robins Bar Date Order.
32. See Vancouver Women's Health Collective Soc'y v. A.H. Robins Co., 820 F.2d
1359, 1360-61 (4th Cir. 1987) (discussing Robins Bar Date Order and notice procedure
in context of upholding foreign notice procedure); In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742,
745 (E.D. Va. 1988) (discussing Robins Bar Date Order and authorizing Robins to
undertake international campaign to notify all unknown claimants of Robins Bar Date in
context of confirming plan of reorganization), aff'd sub nom. Menard-Sanford v. Mabey
(In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989).
33. A.H. Robins, 8 B.R. at 745. For a description of the two-step filing procedure,
see In re A.H. Robins Co., 862 F.2d 1092, 1093 (4th Cir. 1988), rev'd in part on reh'g
on other grounds, 871 F.2d 465 (4th Cir. 1989).
34. See Debtor's Sixth Amended and Restated Plan of Reorganization 3 [hereinafter
Robins Plan]. So-called late claims can be filed with and considered by the Claims
Resolution Facility established in the Robins Plan to administer the trust for personal
injury claimants. See Dalkon Shield Trust Claims Resolution Facility 6-7. Claims filed
late because of "excusable neglect" are entitled to treatment on par with timely claims
with respect to trust monies. Id. at 6. If a later claimant first manifests an injury
subsequent to the Robins Bar Date and can demonstrate either lack of actual knowledge
of the bar date or lack of knowledge of Dalkon Shield use, her claim may fit within the
excusable neglect category. Id. at 7.
35. Section 8.01 of the Robins Plan provides for the discharge of, among other debts,
all those arising out of Dalkon Shield claims. Robins Plan, supra note 34, § 8.01, at 16.
19931
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trust.16 To ensure the practical dischargeability of future claims, the
bankruptcy court also issued a "channeling injunction," which enjoined
claimants from pursuing Dalkon Shield claims against the debtor's successor
and channeled all such Dalkon Shield claims against an established
claimants' trust.
37
With respect to future claimants, the A.H. Robins court took additional
steps to ensure that those who "'[t]hough not aware of any injury, . . . may
have been injured by [their] use or another's use of the Dalkon Shield' "38
received notice. In addition, the Court appointed a legal representative to
represent the interests of future claimants.39 Further, the Court considered
the estimated value of future claims when determining the amount of money
necessary to fund the claimants' trust.40
The Manville court addressed the problem of future claims with
suspenders alone. Although it similarly appointed a legal representative to
represent the interests of future claimants, 4' estimated future claims for
purposes of determining the plan's feasibility,42 and established a personal
injury trust through which these claims were to be addressed, the court did
not set a bar date. The court avoided deciding whether future claims qualify
as dischargeable claims under the Code 3 and instead issued only a
36. Id. §§ 8.01, 8.03, 8.04, at 16-17.
37. Id. § 8.04(c), at 17. The Robins Plan also includes a controversial provision
enjoining claimants from bringing suits against the Robins family and company officials
as well as doctors or other healthcare providers who might otherwise have been sued for
malpractice in connection with the Dalkon Shield insertion or removal. Id. § 8.03, at 16;
see also Vairo, supra note 7, at 629-30 (briefly discussing controversy over enjoining
suits against nondebtor third parties).
38. Grady v. A.H. Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198, 202 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S.
1260 (1988).
39. In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742, 744 (E.D. Va. 1988), aff'd sub nom.
Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989).
40. Id. A great deal of work on the part of all parties preceded the court's aggregate
estimation of all Dalkon Shield claims. The court estimated the claims only after the
parties were unable, after extensive data collection, to agree on their value. See generally
Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659,
675-88 (1989).
41. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 727,741-42 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), appeal
denied, 39 B.R. 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
42. See Findley v. Blinken (In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.), 122 B.R. 6,
6-7 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1990) (discussing appointment of neutral experts to determine value
and nature of claims against settlement trust).
43. Nor did the Manville court set a bar date for present asbestos claims. All asbestos
claims were directed against the established trusts. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68
B.R. 618, 628 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 78 B.R. 407
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channeling injunction that directed all asbestos-related personal injury claims
solely against the established personal injury trust." Although this ap-
proach acknowledged in principle the perplexing statutory and due process
concerns surrounding the discharge of future claims, its intended practical
effect was to discharge all present and future claims.
The Manville solution greatly influenced later courts handling asbestos-
related bankruptcies. Some earlier decisions had determined that the
prospect of the unknown prevented the treatment of future claims entirely.
As a result, these courts concluded that future claims did not qualify as
dischargeable claims and that future claimants did not require legal represen-
tation.45 Against the Manville backdrop, a few courts continued to hedge
about the status of future claims, but nevertheless recognized the need to
appoint representation for future claimants.4 6 Most courts, following the
Manville model, appointed legal representatives and chose to use channeling
injunctions that restrict future claims to an established trust.47
A channeling injunction employed to effect a discharge, however, is
fraught with analytical and practical difficulties. Even when joined with the
appointment of a future claims representative, the use of a channeling
injunction does not ensure that future claimants will be able to participate
in a reorganization with the same rights held by other creditors. A
channeling injunction without designation of future claims as cognizable
claims under the Code leaves voting and other statutory rights unavailable,
or at least ill-defined, for future claimants. Also, such a channeling
injunction could be said to operate as an illegal tax on present claimants'
return: Why, after all, should a true creditor holding a cognizable claim
share an insolvent company's value with an unidentifiable group of
nonclaimants holding no claims? Moreover, the use of a channeling
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd sub nom. Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir.
1988).
44. See id. at 624. A property damage trust was also established. Id. at 621.
45. See In re Amatex Corp., 30 B.R. 309, 315-16 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.), opinion
adopted, 37 B.R. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1983), rev'd, 755 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1985); In re UNR
Indus., 29 B.R. 741, 745 (N.D. Ill. 1983), appeal dismissed, 725 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir.
1984).
46. See Amatex, 755 F.2d at 1042, 1044 (remanding to lower court with instruction
to appoint legal representative because future claimants are "sufficiently affected by the
reorganization proceedings to require some voice in them"); In re UNR Indus., 46 B.R.
671, 675 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985) (holding that future claimants qualify as parties in
interest entitled to legal representation); see also In re Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 58
B.R. 476, 477-78 (Bankr. N.D. Il. 1986) (appointing legal representative in Chapter 11
liquidation case although aware that future claimants did not have claims against the
debtor).
47. See CELOTEX REPORT, supra note 6, at 124-126.
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injunction may exacerbate the statutory and constitutional problems faced by
the court.4" Finally, the channeling injunction is perhaps more susceptible
of being vacated by a court if deemed necessary.49 In the teeth of these
difficulties with channeling injunctions, bankruptcy courts in asbestos cases
have nevertheless relied exclusively upon it while rejecting statutory
discharge, presumably in part, out of a healthy concern for the constitutional
rights of the future claimants.
The A.H. Robins and Manville courts were confronted with future
claims problems that differed in a few significant respects. The Manville
problems presented more difficult constitutional concerns. Although the
number of possible Dalkon Shield claims in the A.H. Robins case may have
been large, it was clearly limited; a limited number of Dalkon Shields had
been produced and used. Furthermore, while a future claimant in A.H.
Robins would not necessarily have known of the nature or extent of any
possible Dalkon Shield-related injury by the Robins Bar Date, she was at
least likely to have known of her use of the Dalkon Shield. To the extent
that claimants knew that they had used some company's intrauterine device,
48. In the National Gypsum case, for example, the court-appointed representative for
future claimants opposed the use of a channeling injunction by arguing, among other
things, that the bankruptcy court lacked authority to enjoin future claims against the
reorganized companies because such action would be tantamount to the discharge of
nonclaims. Operating under the assumption that the debtors would remain well capitalized
upon reorganization, the claims representative requested that future claimants retain the
right to pursue their future claims against the reorganized companies. (Notably, since the
commencement of their cases, the debtors had been claiming that asbestos-related
liabilities would have no material adverse effect on their ongoing financial condition). See
DAILY BANKR. REv., Jan. 6, 1993, at 6. The future claims representative further
objected to the channeling injunction based upon the following: (1) the court's alleged
lack of authority to approve it at all; (2) the alleged procedural impropriety of the
debtors' seeking it via plan approval rather than a separate proceeding; and (3) the
injunction's alleged improper scope to the extent that it would protect nondebtor third
parties. Id. at 5. Ultimately, while confirming the National Gypsum plan of reorganiza-
tion, the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas declined to issue a
permanent injunction barring future claims against the reorganized debtor. See In re
National Gypsum, No. 390-37213-SAF-11, slip op. at 33 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Jan. 29,
1993) (stating that "[n]on-Bankruptcy Code claimants must be able to pursue their
remedies in the future after the exhaustion of the ... trust [established through the
reorganization plan]").
49. It appears that the threat of vacating the injunction prompted Manville to place
more money in the already established Manville trust. Nevertheless, a recent decision in
the case appears to support the constitutionality of channeling injunctions, suggesting that
the Manville injunction set forth in the confirmed plan of reorganization can best be
altered by filing a second bankruptcy. See Findley v. Blinken (In re Joint E. & S. Dist.
Asbestos Litig.), 982 F.2d 721, 751 (2d Cir. 1992), modified on reh'g other grounds,
993 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1993).
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the notice procedures could also be tailored to reflect this fact.50 Arguably
then, a notice procedure in the A.H. Robins case, though expensive, could
be reasonably calculated to reach users of the Dalkon Shield to apprise them
of their future claims.
In contrast, the number and identity of future claimants in Manville and
the other asbestos cases is more problematic. Future claims in these cases
could be held by future claimants who have yet to develop an asbestos-
related disease but know of their prebankruptcy exposure to asbestos. On the
other hand, many future claimants have neither symptoms of an asbestos-
related disease nor knowledge of their prebankruptcy exposure. It is, of
course, the unforeseen and unascertainable nature of this second type of
future claim that appears to generate the most difficult constitutional
problems.5'
A healthy concern for due process may prompt courts to elect a
channeling injunction, instead of a discharge, in order to preserve going
concern value and provide for future claimants, but the effect on claimants'
rights is virtually the same. Either the discharge and the injunction are
constitutionally impermissible, or both are permissible.
50. In this regard, the notice procedures in the A.H. Robins case suggested that
women who knew they had used an intrauterine device see their doctors and check their
medical records. Moreover, the Claims Resolution Facility established by the Robins
Plan included provisions that permitted certain categories of women to file late claims
against the trust, which claims would nevertheless be treated as timely filed when late
filing was due to excusable neglect. See Dalkon Shield Trust Claims Resolution Facility
6-7.
51. As one book reviewer explained when comparing the future claims estimation
problem faced by Judge Lifland (the Manville judge) to that of Judges Merhige and
Shelley (the A.H. Robins judges):
Lifland's job was harder in the respect that the dimensions of "unknown"
were greater. In Robins, one could get at least some fix on who the claimants
were; the real issue was how badly they had suffered, or would suffer. In
Manville the participants had to cope not only with the problem of uliknown
claims, but also of unknown claimants-the statistical certainty that persons
in a defined group would someday show symptoms of asbestosis, even though
no one knew which ones yet.
Ayer, supra note 8, at 1596 n.51 (citing In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 628-
29 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 78 B.R. 407 (S.D.N.Y.
1987), aff'd sub nom. Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988)); see
In re Amatex Corp., 37 B.R. 613, 614 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (stating, in dictum, that "genuine
or meaningful notice" could never be given to future asbestosis claimants), rev'd, 755
F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1985); In re UNR Indus., 29 B.R. 741 748 (N.D. Il. 1983) (holding
that practical and legal problems of notifying future asbestosis claimants would be
insurmountable), appeal denied, 725 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1984).
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IV. FIFTH AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS ON CONGRESS'S POWER TO
DISCHARGE FUTURE CLAIMS
The Bankruptcy Clause of the United States Constitution vests Congress
with the power "to establish ... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankrupt-
cies throughout the United States."52 This power, the Bankruptcy Power,
construed by courts to be both broad 3 and flexible,54 affords Congress
far-reaching discretion to modify the rights of parties in interest in a bank-
ruptcy. 5 In fact, the Supreme Court has stated that "Congress may
prescribe any regulations concerning discharge in bankruptcy that are not so
grossly unreasonable as to be incompatible with fundamental law."
56
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
53. See, e.g., Edward Pirsig Farms, Inc. v. John Deere Co. (In re Pirsig Farms,
Inc.), 46 B.R. 237, 244 (D. Minn. 1985) (stating that the Bankruptcy Power gives
Congress "broad authority to establish bankruptcy laws"); In re Bullington, 80 B.R. 590,
593 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1987) (stating that the Bankruptcy Power is "broad enough to
permit modification of contractual rights"), aff'd sub nom. Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Bullington, 89 B.R. 1010 (M.D. Ga. 1988), aff'd, 878 F.2d 354 (11th Cir. 1989);
Security Pac. Fin. Corp. v. Barto (In re Barto), 8 B.R. 145, 148 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981)
("[l]t is clear that Congress has extremely broad power in the realm of bankruptcy
legislation."), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Security Pac. Fin. Co., 704 F.2d 142 (4th
Cir. 1983); In re Sapolin Paints, Inc., 5 B.R. 412, 423 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980) (stating
that the Bankruptcy Power gives Congress "broad latitude to effect both contract and
property rights"); Hoops v. Freedom Fin. (In re Hoops), 3 B.R. 635, 640 (Bankr. D.
Colo. 1980) (stating that the Bankruptcy Power is "broad and evolving"), aff'd sub nom.
Rodrock v. Security Indus. Bank, 642 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1981), aff'd sub nom. United
States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982); see also In re Gifford, 688 F.2d
447, 462 (7th Cir. 1982) (noting courts' "highly expansive conception of the bankruptcy
power").
54. See, e.g., Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Perimeter Park Inv. Assocs. (In re
Perimeter Park Inv. Assocs.), 697 F.2d 945, 950 n.4 (l1th Cir. 1983) (stating that the
Bankruptcy Power is "not static," but rather "a flexible power on which Congress [can]
expand with statutes appropriate to the change of conditions of the times"); In re Barto,
8 B.R. at 148 ("The Congressional power relative to bankruptcies is a flexible tool which
can be utilized to meet the exigencies of the contemporary economic environment.").
55. One court summarizes the scope of the Bankruptcy Power as follows:
"[It extends to all cases where the law causes to be distributed the property
of the debtor among his creditors; this is its least limit. Its greatest is the
discharge of a debtor from his contracts. And all intermediate legislation,
affecting substance and form, but tending to further the great end of the
subject-distribution and discharge-are in the competency and discretion of
Congress."
In re Bullington, 80 B.R. at 592 (quoting In re Klein, 14 F. Cas. 716,718 (C.C.D. Mo.
1843) (No. 7865)).
56. HanoverNat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181,192 (1902) (upholding Bankruptcy
Act of 1898 against constitutional challenges); see SEC v. Albert & Maguire Sec. Co.,
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According to one commentator, "[e]xercise of the Bankruptcy Power
requires little more than a fair and reasonable treatment of liabilities and
assets," 57 be it through the equitable distribution of a debtor's property, the
discharge of its debts, or other related means.
5 8
Nevertheless, the Bankruptcy Power is not absolute. As the Supreme
Court recognized in Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford,5 9 the
Bankruptcy Power, "like the other great substantive powers of Congress, is
subject to the Fifth Amendment."' Resolving the proper treatment of
future claims in the mass tort context thus requires an examination of the
substantive and procedural Fifth Amendment limits placed upon Congress's
authority to discharge debt pursuant to its Bankruptcy Power." Courts
378 F. Supp. 906, 912 (E.D. Pa. 1974) ("[Uinder its bankruptcy power, Congress may
so legislate as to affect, modify or perhaps destroy vested rights. The test is whether the
Congressional solution is so 'grossly arbitrary and unreasonable as to be incompatible
with fundamental law.'") (quoting Campbell v. Allegheny Corp., 75 F.2d 947, 953 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 581 (1935)).
57. MARTIN J. BIENENSTOCK, BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION 692 (1987) (citing
Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 445 (1937)).
58. Id. at 718.
59. 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
60. Id. at 589 (footnote omitted); accordBlanchette v. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corps.,
419 U.S. 102, 162 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Community Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. v. Persky (In re Persky), 134 B.R. 81, 95 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991); Security
Pac. Fin. Corp. v. Barto (In re Barto), 8 B.R. 145, 148 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981), aff'd
sub nom. United States v. Security Pac. Fin. Co., 704 F.2d 142 (4th Cir. 1983).
61. A few commentators have argued, contrary to most case law, that the Fifth
Amendment does not provide an independent source of limitation on the substantive
scope of Congress's Bankruptcy Power-i.e., that such power is limited only by the
scope of the Bankruptcy Clause itself. See James S. Rogers, The Impairment of Secured
Creditors' Rights in Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth
Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV. L. REv. 973 (1983); accord Thomas
H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REv. 725, 736 n.29 (1984);
Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment
of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors
in Bankruptcy, 51 U. Cm. L. REv. 97, 100 n.14 (1984). According to Rogers:
[The famous statement [in Radford] that the bankruptcy power is subject to
the fifth amendment must be taken to mean nothing more than that the fifth
amendment, through either the due process or the takings clause, is the
constitutional foundation for the proposition that statutes that retroactively
disrupt settled expectations may be subject to particularly attentive judicial
scrutiny.
Rogers, supra, at 985 (emphasis added). Rogers further states that substantive limits on
the discharge provided by Congress in § 1141 of the Bankruptcy Code exist only insofar
as that section attempts to discharge legitimate expectations that became settled before
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978. A further discussion of possible substantive
due process limits follows infra part IV.C.
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have only occasionally, and then only briefly, analyzed the Fifth Amend-
ment limits upon the discharge of future claims62 or the issuance of
channeling injunctions.63 It is to these constitutional concerns that we now
turn.
A. The Takings Clause
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that "private
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation. "64
The purpose of this clause is "to bar Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole."' In United States v. Security Industrial
Bank,' the Supreme Court acknowledged that Congress's Bankruptcy
Power is subject to this Fifth Amendment prohibition.67 As then-Associate
Justice Rehnquist explained, "however 'rational' the exercise of the
bankruptcy power may be, that inquiry is quite separate from the question
whether the enactment [of bankruptcy legislation] takes property within the
prohibition of the Fifth Amendment."68 Nevertheless, the convergence of
modem takings jurisprudence and bankruptcy law suggests that the discharge
in bankruptcy of unsecured claims-much less future unsecured
62. See, e.g., In re Amatex Corp., 37 B.R. 613, 614 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (stating, in
dictum, that there can be "[n]o genuine or meaningful notice" given to future claimants
suffering from asbestos-related diseases in order to satisfy due process), rev'd on other
grounds, 755 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1985); In re UNR Indus., 29 B.R. 741, 747 (N.D. Ill.
1983) (noting alleged insurmountability of notice problem with respect to future
claimants), appeal dismissed, 725 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Waterman S.S.
Corp. v. Aguiar (In re Waterman S.S. Corp.), 141 B.R. 552, 558-59 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1992) (discussing limitations of publication notice with respect to future asbestos
claimants), vacated, 157 B.R. 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
63. See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., 88 B.R. 742, 744-45 (E.D. Va. 1988) (noting
in confirmation ruling that method of notice to unknown Dalkon Shield users satisfied
due process), aff'd sub nom. Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880
F.2d 694 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68
B.R. 618, 626 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 78 B.R. 406
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd sub nom. Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir.
1988).
64. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 4.
65. Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 227 (1986) (citations
omitted); see Metropolitan Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Rhode Island Insurer's
Insolvency Fund, 811 F. Supp. 54, 59 (D.R.I. 1993).
66. 459 U.S. 70 (1982).
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claims-does not effect a taking without compensation in violation of the
Constitution.
In constitutional terms, a regulatory taking occurs when three elements
are met: (1) a property interest protected by the takings clause exists; (2) it
is taken via legislative enactment; and (3) the taking is for public use.69 In
the early days, courts may have required a stronger showing of government
justification for property regulation; however, modem takings jurisprudence
begins with the presumption that the government has broad authority to
regulate private property.70 The Supreme Court has recently concluded that
statutory actions which adjust "the benefits and burdens of economic life to
promote the common good" do not constitute compensable takings.7 In
this context, the Court has recognized only two categories of regulatory
action in which compensable takings can be established prima facie: the so-
called "physical invasion" of property and the destruction of all economical-
ly beneficial or productive use of land.72 Significantly, both categories
involve the regulation of traditional, real property interests,73 thus strongly
suggesting that courts are still most likely to find a taking where traditional
property interests are affected. The emphasis on real property interests
further suggests that the first of the three takings elements-the existence of
a property interest-may be the most important with respect to an analysis
of the discharge of future claims.
1. The Takings Clause: Private Property
In order to establish that a taking has occurred, a party must first prove
that the government regulation at issue "interfere[s] with interests that [are]
sufficiently bound up with. . . reasonable expectations . . . to constitute
69. See Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225; Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,
1003-04, 1014-16 (1984).
70. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A Critical Reexamination of the Takings Jurisprudence,
90 Micd. L. REv. 1892, 1924 (1992). According to Professor Lunney, Supreme Court
decisions formerly required the government to justify the use of its police power for the
community good in order to overcome the property owner's presumed right to be free
from regulation. Modem case law reverses this perspective by articulating a limited set
of circumstances that justify the property owner's individual control of property.
71. Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225 (citations omitted); see Metropolitan Property & Cas.
Ins. Co., 811 F. Supp. at 57.
72. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992).
73. According to Professor Lunney, the Supreme Court has required compensation
in only two situations: (1) when government action affects the right of exclusive
occupancy, or (2) when government action that is unnecessary to achieve a substantial
government purpose "impinge[s] on a right essential to our conception of real property
ownership." Lunney, supra note 70, at 1927.
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'property' for Fifth Amendment purposes." 74 For purposes of a takings
analysis, 5 protectable property interests "are created and their dimensions
are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an indepen-
dent source such as state law."76 Theoretically, such property interests
extend beyond real property interests to any ownership interests,77 as long
as these interests prove to be more than "abstract needs" or "unilateral
expectations. "7'8 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court seldom recognizes
intangible property interests as cognizable property rights in the takings
context.7 9
Under a Takings Clause analysis, purported property interests that are
found to be contingent, revocable, or speculative will not support a
constitutional claim for compensation." Significant in this regard, several
74. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978); see
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895, 2902-04; Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174
(1979); Preseault v. United States, 27 Cl. Ct. 69, 84 (1992).
75. As discussed more fully infra parts IV.C & E., the term "property" is defined
differently for purposes of a Takings Clause analysis, a substantive due process analysis
and a procedural due process analysis. See Burns Harbor Fish Co. v. Ralston, 800 F.
Supp. 722, 727, 729 (S.D. Ind. 1992); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nevada, 776
F. Supp. 528, 532 (D. Nev. 1991) (stating that a cause of action may be species of
property for some constitutional purposes but not others); In re Consolidated United
States Atmospheric Testing Litig., 616 F. Supp. 759, 770 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (same), aff'd
sub nom. Konizeski v. Livermore Labs (In re Consolidated United States Atmospheric
Testing Litig.), 820 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 905 (1988).
76. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984); see Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972). As the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York recently
stated: "[S]ince ... it is state law that both creates property rights and defines their
scope, it is not within the province of federal courts to question the purpose or policies
underlying such well-settled state law or the nature of the property rights established
thereby." Community Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Persky (In re Persky), 134 B.R. 81,
87 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979)).
77. The United States Court of Claims has recently stated that property for purposes
of a Takings Clause analysis "includes every interest any individual may have in any and
everything which is the subject of ownership, together with the right to possess, use,
enjoy and dispose of the same." Board of County Supervisors v. United States, 23 Cl.
Ct. 205, 208 (1991).
78. See Lovell v. The One Bancorp, 818 F. Supp. 412, 420 (D. Me. 1993) (citing
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577; Lowe v. Scott, 959 F.2d 323, 334 (1st Cir.
1992)).
79. Arguably, the Supreme Court has extended its protection to intangible property
interests unrelated to real property insofar as it has determined that trade secrets qualified
as protectable property interests improperly taken by a federal statute. See Monsanto, 467
U.S. at 1011.
80. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 674 n.6 (1981); Lovell, 818 F.
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courts have determined that causes of action do not vest and become
protectable property interests until they have proceeded to final judgment."1
Other courts have determined that, for purposes of a takings analysis, causes
of action become protectable property only when the claim accrues under
state law." Perhaps in recognition that, under most state laws, a cause of
action in tort will not accrue until an injury or disease has become
manifest, 3 at least two courts have implied that tort causes of action will
Supp. at 420; FDIC v. Cobblestone Corp., Nos. 91-12741-Z, 91-13215-Z, 1992 WL
333961, **3-4 (D. Mass. Oct. 28, 1992); see also First Nat'l Bank v. Hamilton (In re
Hamilton), 18 B.R. 868, 870 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1982) (finding that Code § 522(t) did not
effect an unconstitutional taking of property by avoiding liens in after-acquired property
and that alleged property interest was not vested "because, by definition, after acquired
property is a mere contingency"); cf. Preseault v. United States, 27 Cl. Ct. 69, 87
(1992) (suggesting that protectable property right must stem from an "historically rooted
expectancy").
81. See Grimesy v. Huff, 876 F.2d 738, 744 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
1620 (1991) (upholding constitutionality of California statute that reduced aid to families
with dependent children provided to eighteen-year-old mothers who reside with their
parents); Hammond v. United States, 786 F.2d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 1986) (upholding
application of statute that operated to bar plaintiffs' recovery by substituting United States
as defendant to nuclear testing litigation); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nevada, 776
F. Supp. 528, 532 (D. Nev. 1991); cf. Eddings v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 835 F.2d
1369, 1374 n.9 (11th Cir.) (holding no violation of Fourteenth Amendment in retroactive
application of 12-year statute of repose that barred plaintiffs' relief; questioning whether
even accrued cause of action translates into "vested property right" protected by Due
Process Clause), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 822 (1988).
82. See Alpine Ridge Group v. Kemp, 955 F.2d 1382, 1386 (9th Cir. 1992)
(suggesting that accrued claims may constitute property rights for purposes of takings
analysis) (citing Konizeski v. Livermore Labs (In re Consolidated United States
Atmospheric Testing Litig.), 820 F.2d 982, 989 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
905 (1988)), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Group, 113 S.
Ct. 1898 (1993); Opdyke Inv. Co. v. City of Detroit, 883 F.2d 1265, 1274-75 (6th Cir.
1989) (stating that accrued cause of action is species of property for purposes of takings
analysis) (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982)); De
Rodulfa v. United States, 461 F.2d 1240, 1257 (D.C. Cir.) ("[VJested cause of action,
whether emanating from contract or common law principles, may constitute property
beyond the power of the legislature to take away ....") (emphasis added), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 949 (1972).
83. See In re Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 974 F.2d 775, 781 (7th Cir. 1992).
It should be noted in this regard, however, that some states do recognize a right to bring
a cause of action in tort for "medical monitoring," "fear of injury," or "enhanced risk"
prior to the manifestation of actual injury. See Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d
287 (N.J. 1987). Arguably, the existence of state statutes in this vein provides a basis for
finding a property right deserving of constitutional protection. Whether property rights
stemming from "medical monitoring" or "risk of injury" cases will be judicially
recognized has yet to be determined. See Ellen Joan Pollock, Claims Increase for No-
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not rise to the level of protectable property, at least until such time.'
Finally, although the Supreme Court has recognized that a present cause of
action based on tort law might be considered protectable property for
purposes of procedural due process,' the Court has never gone so far in
a takings analysis. Taken together, these facts suggest that future claims,
which are inherently speculative and contingent, generally do not qualify as
protectable property interests in the takings context.
In the bankruptcy context, it is even more unlikely that tort claims
(much less future claims) will qualify as protectable property interests for
purposes of a takings analysis. When drafting the adequate protection
provision of the Bankruptcy Code,86 in an effort to avoid the unconstitu-
tional impairment of property rights,' Congress assumed that secured
creditors are the only parties with property interests at risk of being taken
in bankruptcy."8 By concluding that the secured creditor's adequate
protection extends only to the value of the secured property, 9 thus leaving
Injury Medical Testing, WALL ST. J., May 12, 1993, at 1; Edward Felsenthal, Risk-of-
Illness Cases Are Getting Unsympathetic Ear from Courts, WALL ST. J., July 7, 1993,
at B8.
84. See In re Aircrash in Bali, Indonesia on April 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301, 1312-13
(9th Cir. 1982) (determining that accrued claims for wrongful death of relatives qualify
under California law as protectable property interests for takings purposes); Greyhound
Food Mgmt., Inc. v. City of Dayton, 653 F. Supp. 1207, 1219 (S.D. Ohio 1986)
(finding that tort cause of action, which arises under Ohio law once injury manifests,
constitutes property within meaning of Takings Clause), aff'd and remanded, 852 F.2d
866 (6th Cir. 1988).
85. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
86. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (1988).
87. See Lend Lease v. Briggs Transp. Co. (In re Briggs Transp. Co.), 780 F.2d
1339, 1342 (8th Cir. 1985); First Bank v. Wieseler, 45 B.R. 871, 874 n.1 (D.S.D.
1985); Southerton Corp. v. United Penn Bank (In re Southerton Corp.), 46 B.R. 391,
397 (M.D. Pa. 1982); In re Lipply, 56 B.R. 524, 526 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986); In re
Magnus, 50 B.R. 241, 243 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985); First Agric. Bank v. Jug End in the
Berkshires, Inc. (In re Jug End in the Berkshires, Inc.), 46 B.R. 892, 898-99 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1985).
88. See Francis F. Gecker, Comment, The Recovery of Opportunity Costs as Just
Compensation:A Takings Analysis ofAdequate Protection, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 953, 953-
54 (1987) (arguing that, because Congress derived the concept of adequate protection of
secured creditors from the limitations placed on the Bankruptcy Power by the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment as recognized in Radford, courts should use a takings
analysis in deciding secured creditors' motions for adequate protection).
89. See, e.g., United Says. Assoc. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. (In re
Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs.), 793 F.2d 1380, 1390 n.14 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd,
808 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc), aff'd, 484 U.S. 365 (1988); In re Briggs
Transp. Co., 780 F.2d at 1342 ("By providing a creditor with a means of protecting its
interest through section 362(d)'s adequate protection requirement, the competing interests
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the creditor with an unsecured claim for the difference between the full
claim and the property value, courts have tacitly confirmed Congress's
assumption. At least one court has all but stated that unsecured claims may
be destroyed in bankruptcy proceedings without constitutional problems.'
Thus, to the extent that a tort cause of action is unsecured, decisional
authority that it does not constitute property for purposes of a takings
analysis already exists in the bankruptcy context.91
The most recent Supreme Court banLuptcy precedent in the takings
area underscores the notion that only secured creditors possess the sort of
traditional property right afforded constitutional protection in a takings
context. While the Court in United States v. Security Industrial Bank stated
that the retroactive application of a lien-avoidance provision of the
Bankruptcy Code would effect a taking without just compensation of the
of the debtor's need to reorganize and the secured creditor's entitlement to constitutional
protection of its bargained-for property interests are reconciled."); In re Kerwin-White,
129 B.R. 375, 384 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1991) (noting that bankruptcy court may, based on
fair market value, "determine and limit the value of an over-secured or under-secured
creditor's interest in collateral without violating the Fifth Amendment"), aff'd sub nom.
First Brandon Nat'l Bank v. Kerwin (In re Kerwin), 996 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1993); In re
Bullington, 80 B.R. 590, 593 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1987) (stating that adequate protection
concept protected plaintiff's Fifth Amendment property rights to its security; "There is
no constitutional right to more than the value of the security."), aff'd sub nom. Travelers
Ins. Co. v. Bullington, 89 B.R. 1010 (M.D. Ga. 1988), af6'd, 878 F.2d 354 (11th Cir.
1989).
90. See Dahlke v. Doering, 94 B.R. 569, 573 n.6 (D. Minn. 1989) ("An unsecured
creditor is subject to considerable impairment of his claim, the most severe being a
complete discharge of the debt .... The Supreme Court has upheld the validity of the
reduction or destruction of unsecured creditors' claims.") (citing Hanover Nat'l Bank v.
Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 188 (1902); Rogers, supra note 61, at 989).
91. Even where a cause of action proceeds to judgment and arguably becomes secured
by virtue of a judicial lien, courts have determined that such claims do not constitute
property for purposes of a bankruptcy/takings analysis. See Commonwealth Nat'l Bank
v. United States (In re Ashe), 712 F.2d 864, 869 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1024 (1984); Hinson v. Lexington State Bank (In re Hinson), 20 B.R. 753, 758-59
(Bankr. D.S.C. 1982); Flege v. Akron City Hospital (In re Flege), 17 B.R. 690, 696-97
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982); In re Habeeb-Ullah, 16 B.R. 831, 832-33 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y.
1982). Largely, the courts reason that, under state law, judicial liens do not give the
party an interest in a specific piece of the debtor's property, as do mortgages or other
security interests. See id.; cf. Taylor v. King (In re King), 18 B.R. 181, 183 (Bankr.
D.R.I. 1982) (finding that consent judgment did not constitute protectable property
because, under Rhode Island law, judgment is perfected only after executionand by levy
on property of the debtor); Golden v. City Nat'l Bank (In re Golden), 16 B.R. 580, 582
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981) (suggesting that, although judicial lien placed cloud on title of
property, under Florida law such lien did not qualify as protectable property interest for
takings analysis because state law also prohibited execution of lien against homestead).
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secured creditor's property, it also recognized that the Bankruptcy Power
authorizes impairment of contractual obligations.' Implicit in this holding
is the idea that the exercise of the Bankruptcy Power in a manner that
radically affects or eliminates nontraditional property (i.e., contractual rights
or tort claims) does not rise to the level of a taking.' Viewed in this light,
tort claims are less likely than contract claims to rise to the level of
protectable property interests.94 By virtue of being at least one step further
removed from traditionally recognized property interests, contingent future
claims are even less likely to qualify as protectable property for purposes of
a bankruptcy/takings analysis. Even if they did by some extraordinary
measure qualify as a protectable interest, however, the discharge of future
claims probably would not satisfy the second element necessary to establish
a compensable taking.
2. The Takings Clause: Taken
If a property interest is established, courts determine whether a taking
has occurred by resorting to an ad hoe, factual inquiry.95 While "es-
chew[ing]" the development of any "set formula" in making this determina-
92. 459 U.S. 70, 74-75 (1982) (citing Hanover Nat'I Bank, 186 U.S. at 188).
93. It has been suggested that "takings" do not occur in the bankruptcy context in part
because of the special protective procedures available under the Code. As Alexander
Cohen and Joseph Ravitch have stated in passing:
The availability of alternative protections has been an important element in
cases considering takings claims. For example, despite dicta to the con-
trary ... , it is now clear that the Just Compensation Clause does not extend
to creditors in domestic bankruptcy proceedings. Such creditors are not,
however, completely unprotected. Although they may not receive Fifth
Amendment compensation for their destroyed expectations, all bankruptcy
proceedings are carefully monitored through a number of unique procedural
due process safeguards. Thus, the lack of just compensation in the bankruptcy
context is balanced by significant protections in the legal process against
arbitrary governmental action.
Alexander F. Cohen & Joseph Ravitch, Economic Sanctions, Domestic Deprivations, and
the Just Compensation Clause: Enforcing the Fifth Amendment in the Foreign Affairs
Context, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 146, 160-61 (1988) (citations omitted).
94. See In re Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 974 F.2d 775, 781 (7th Cir. 1992);
United States v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997, 1003-05 (2d Cir.
1991); Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp. (Conrail), 758 F.2d 936, 943 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985).
95. See Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986);
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984); Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); North Ark. Med. Ctr. v. Barrett, 962 F.2d 780, 790 (8th Cir.
1992); United States Trustee v. Prines (In re Prines), 867 F.2d 478, 485 (8th Cir. 1989).
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tion,96 courts will consider three primary factors: (1) the character of the
governmental action (i.e., a complete destruction, extinction, or invasion of
a property right versus a mere diminution in its value); (2) the economic
impact of the act; and (3) whether there will be an interference with
"reasonable investment-backed expectations."'
With respect to the character of the governmental action-sometimes
considered to be the determinative factorgS-the discharge of future claims
passes muster. To the extent that a discharge is made in conjunction with the
establishment of a trust fund for future claimants, one can well argue that
the discharge actually serves to augment any otherwise nearly worthless
property rights held by future claimants. In other words, discharge in
conjunction with the establishment of a fund saves some of the debtor's
assets from present creditors in order to protect future claimants. Moreover,
if no fund is established to satisfy future claims because they are wholly
unknown and unanticipated, then their present value is nil, and no present
expectation is extinguished.99
With regard to the economic impact of the discharge and its interfer-
ence with investment-backed expectation, the foregoing analysis seems
equally telling. A future claimant's expectation of compensation arguably is
not "investment-backed." Nor may it be "reasonable" for future claimants
to expect that Congress cannot or will not pass legislation-particularly
bankruptcy legislation-that places limitations on the rights of tort vic-
tims.1° At the very least, a "creditor who contends that. . . application
96. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992) (citing
Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)); see
McAndrews v. Fleet Bank, 989 F.2d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 1993).
97. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980); Penn Central, 438
U.S. at 130-31; McAndrews, 989 F.2d at 18; Prines, 867 F.2d at 485.
98. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-37
(1982); Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393, 415-16 (1922).
99. Arguably, the distinction between extinction of a property right and mere
diminution of that right is artificial because it depends upon how broadly the property
right in question is defined. In Security Indus. Bank, for example, the Supreme Court
determined that the retrospective application of Bankruptcy Code § 522(f)(2) to avoid a
secured creditor's lien completely destroyed that creditor's "bundle of rights." See
United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 75 (1982). One can nevertheless
argue that the application of the statute to the secured creditor would merely diminish
rather than destroy that secured creditor's rights: The destruction of the lien would still
leave the formerly secured creditor with an unsecured claim. See Rogers, supra note 61,
at 1019-20.
100. State legislatures, as well as Congress, have passed various types of tort reform
statutes that have withstood constitutional scrutiny. See, e.g., Duke Power Co. v.
Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 84 (1978) (upholding constitutionality
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of a ... bankruptcy law would disrupt his legitimate expectations in a
manner that would violate the Constitution should bear a very heavy burden
of persuasion. "101
3. The Takings Clause: Public Use
Outside of the bankruptcy context, the third element necessary to find
a compensable taking- that the government action be for public rather than
purely private use-is easily established since the Supreme Court's rulings
on the issue in 1984.1' If the government has rationally determined that
a conceivable public purpose will be served by the legislation that causes an
alleged taking to occur, no further scrutiny of its public or private character
is necessary. 3 The Supreme Court has "rejected the notion that a use is
a public use only if the property taken is put to use for the general pub-
lic." 04 Thus, the scope of the public purpose requirement is "cotermi-
of federal statute that limited damage recovery for nuclear accidents regardless of
liability; deferring to Congress's judgment in balancing the interests of affected groups);
Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co., 791 P.2d 1285, 1293-94 (Idaho 1990) (upholding
constitutionality of statute of repose, which barred product liability actions upon
expiration of limitation period based on useful life of product, as valid exercise of
legislative power to abolish or modify common-law rights and remedies); Fein v.
Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665, 682 (Cal. 1985) (upholding constitutionality of
statute limiting damages in medical malpractice actions), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892
(1985); see also Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929) (deferring to state
legislature's enactment of an automobile guest statute that withdrew a previously
recognized common-law right; noting that the Constitution does not forbid the abolition
of common-law rights if, in doing so, legislature is seeking to attain a permissible
objective); Hammond v. United States, 786 F.2d 8, 11-12 (1st Cir. 1986) (citing
numerous cases upholding retroactive application of statutes that abridge economic and
real property rights created under a prior statute); Pitts v. Unarco Indus., 712 F.2d 276,
279 (7th Cir.) (upholding constitutionality of Indiana statute of repose which barred
plaintiffs wrongful death action against manufacturer of asbestos products brought ten
years after last delivery of asbestos product to decedent's employer), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1003 (1983).
101. Rogers, supra note 61, at 1027.
102. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1984); Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 1014-15 (1984).
103. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1394, 1404
(1992); see also Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1014 ("The role of courts in second-guessing
legislatures' judgment of what constitutes a 'public use' is extremely narrow."). But cf.
Community Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Persky (In re Persky), 134 B.R. 81, 102-04
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991) (suggesting that, in order to satisfy "public use" requirement,
Congress must specifically consider "constraints of the Takings Clause" when enacting
legislation).
104. Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1014.
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nous" with the governmental police power 5 and apparently with the
Bankruptcy Power.' 6
B. The Takings Clause: Summary
While Congressional action against property under the Bankruptcy
Power may be for public use, under present case law future claims are not
property within the meaning of the Takings Clause. Therefore, the discharge
of future claims does not constitute a taking.
C. Substantive Due Process
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o
person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."w'7 Arguably, the due process afforded by this clause is
both substantive and procedural,' although its specific substantive
limiting effect on Congress's Bankruptcy Power is subject to debate.' °9
Assuming that the Fifth Amendment does place substantive limits on
Congress's Bankruptcy Power, however, discharge of future claims under
the Bankruptcy Code survives substantive review. In the post-Lochner"0
105. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 112 S. Ct. at 1404; Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240.
But cf. In re Persky, 134 B.R. at 104.
106. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 145 B.R. 108,
113 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1992) (" The bankruptcy system is a 'public use' within the ambit
of the Fifth Amendment.. . ."); Hill v. Spencer Says. & Loan Ass'n (In re Bevill,
Bresler & Schulman, Inc.), 83 B.R. 880, 896 (D.N.J. 1988) (to same effect). But see
Morel v. Morel (In re Morel), 983 F.2d 104, 105 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding no public use
through application of particular Code section because: "The government does not get
the property. It simply disappears, as a result of long standing policy, expressly
authorized by the [Bankruptcy Power]. The existence of this power has been long
accepted and widely known. It can rightly be regarded as a condition that inheres in
every contract creating a debt."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2423 (1993). For a different
twist with respect to the public use requirement, see In re Persky, 134 B.R. at 103-04
(voiding application of Code § 363(h) "to property rights which had matured and vested
prior to its effective date, for a benefit limited only to this estate's creditors," because
such application did not constitute a public use). The Persky court, rather than treating
public use as a taking element, suggested that a taking occurs where a court finds a
public use to be lacking. See id. at 103.
107. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 3.
108. The Fifth Amendment's procedural due process limitations are discussed infra
part IV.D.
109. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
110. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating, on substantive due
process grounds, a New York law that limited the number of hours that bakery
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era, in which substantive due process review is applied with caution,"'
and economic substantive due process is weak, if not completely dead,"'
any vestige of support for the proposition that substantive due process
protects creditors' rights" 3 does not extend to the protection of unsecured
creditors' property rights. "
4
Under the substantive aspect of the Due Process Clause, legislation
affecting heightened interests-so-called "fundamental rights" "5-is
employees could work).
111. See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 229 (1985) ("The
history of substantive due process counsels caution and restraint. The determination that
a substantive due process right exists is a judgment that certain interests require
particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment.")
(Powell, J., concurring) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
112. See, e.g., Michael J. Phillips, Another Look at Economic Substantive Due
Process, 1987 Wisc. L. REv. 265, 283-88 (stating that, although "not completely
defunct," economic substantive due process boils down to little more than a rational
basis, means-end test); Herman Schwartz, Property Rights and the Constitution: Will the
Ugly Duckling Become a Swan?, 37 AM. U. L. REv. 9, 39 (1987) (stating that attempts
to revive economic substantive due process create constitutionally protected property
rights where they do not properly exist; "Property rights.., are not and were not
intended to be the swan of constitutional law-they really are just ducks, after all, despite
all the quacking.").
113. According to Rogers, "The contention ... reduces to the claim that rather
freewheeling Lochner-style economic substantive due process should be revived. In light
of the glee with which the Supreme Court seizes every available opportunity to repudiate
Lochner yet again, few are likely to pursue that route." Rogers, supra note 61, at 986
(citing, inter alia., Dean v. Gadsden Times Publishing Corp., 412 U.S. 543, 545
(1973)).
114. See Dahlke v. Doering, 94 B.R. 569, 573 (D. Minn. 1989) (noting that the
Supreme Court has "routinely allowed impairment of unsecured creditors' rights");
Credit Alliance Corp. v. Dunning-Ray Ins. Agency, Inc. (In re Blumer), 66 B.R. 109,
114 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986) ("Unsecured creditors have no rights to substantive due
process since an unsecured claim confers no rights in specific property of the obligor.")
(citing Louisville Joint State Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 588 (1935)), aff'd
mem., 826 F.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1987); cf. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bullington, 878 F.2d
354, 359 (11th Cir. 1989) ("It is undisputed that the takings clause of the fifth
amendment protects certain of the rights of secured creditors.... However. . . '[these]
safeguards were provided to protect the rights of secured creditors ... to the extent of
the value of the property. There is no constitutional claim of the creditor to more than
that.'") (citations omitted). But cf. Thorp Credit & Thrift Co. v. Pommerer (In re
Pommerer), 10 B.R. 935, 948 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981) (questioning whether unsecured
creditor should be treated differently from secured creditor for purposes of substantive
due process).
115. Fundamental rights are those that are "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution." San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973);
see Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 229 (Powell, J., concurring)
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subject to a heightened level of judicial scrutiny." 6 The discharge provi-
sions of the Bankruptcy Code, as they pertain to future claims, should not
be subject to this heightened scrutiny because future tort claimants do not
possess rights that qualify as fundamental." 7 Purely economic rights do
not qualify for heightened constitutional protection." 8 Rather, statutes
impairing mere economic and other nonfundamental rights pass constitution-
al scrutiny if they are rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest;
("[S]ubstantive due process rights are created only by the Constitution. .. .");
Mansfield Apartment Owners Ass'n. v. City of Mansfield, 988 F.2d 1469, 1477 (6th
Cir. 1993) (to same effect). According to constitutional scholar John Ely, the Court is
likely to find fundamental rights in "the 'area' (at least the Court sees it as an area) of
sex-marriage-childbearing." John H. Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term-Foreword:
On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REv. 5, 11 & n.40 (1978); see, e.g.,
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to choose abortion); Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (right to use contraceptives); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374 (1978) (right to marry). Among the other rights that the Supreme Court has
held to be fundamental are: freedom of expression and association, see NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); the right to vote and participate in the
electoral process, see Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966);
the right to interstate travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); and the right
to privacy, see, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); cf. Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), rev'g 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985).
116. Legislation that impinges upon fundamental rights is subject to strict scrutiny and,
therefore, must be necessary to promote a compelling or overriding governmental
interest. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 503-04 (1965); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516,
524 (1960); Felice v. Rhode Island Bd. of Elections, 781 F. Supp. 100, 104 (D.R.I.
1991).
117. See Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 787 (W.D. Va. 1986) ("Absent from the
list [of fundamental rights] is the right to a full recovery in tort, which is not a right
guaranteed by the federal Constitution."), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds,
877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989); Walters v. Webre (In re Webre), 88 B.R. 242, 245-46
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1988) (determining that, in Chapter 13 case, right to be paid in full on
judgment obtained for willful and malicious injury is not a fundamental right); Watters
v. Watters, No. 89-F-229, 1990 WL 97830, *3 (D. Colo. June 12, 1989) ("The
Constitution does not create a fundamental right to pursue specific tort actions.... The
Open Access Clause of the First Amendment ... focuses on procedural impediments to
the exercise of existing rights and does not prevent a court from holding that a plaintiff
has no remedy at law for the injuries he may allege.").
118. See North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414
U.S. 156 (1973); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical
of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S.
144 (1938); see also United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446 (1973) (stating that
"bankruptcy legislation is in the area of economics and social welfare" which is "hardly
akin to free speech" or other fundamental rights); cf. Otasco, Inc. v. United States (In
re South), 689 F.2d 162, 165 (10th Cir. 1982) (distinguishing contractual rights and
economic interests from fundamental interests), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983).
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i.e., they must not be arbitrary and capricious in affecting such rights." 9
These statutes "enjoy a presumption of constitutionality that casts a heavy
burden on the part[ies] challenging them. " " Legislation passed pursuant
to Congress's plenary Bankruptcy Power is arguably deserving of an even
greater presumption of constitutionality. 1
21
119. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 83-86 (1978)
(upholding liability-limitation provision in legislation promoting development of nuclear
power); Thompson v. Tulchin (In re Cartridge Television, Inc.), 535 F.2d 1388, 1392
(2d Cir. 1976) (upholding constitutionality of former Bankruptcy Act provision that
disallowed contingent, unprovable claims); Ackles v. A.H. Robins Co. (In re A.H.
Robins Co.), 59 B.R. 99, 103 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Beard v. A.H.
Robins, 828 F.2d 1029 (4th Cir. 1987); Lucas v. Beneficial Fin. Co. (In re Lucas), 18
B.R. 179, 180 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982); Tanner v. FinanceAmerica Consumer Discount
Co. (In re Tanner), 14 B.R. 933, 938-39 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981) (noting that Due
Process Clause is "not a significant restraint" on Congress's right to act prospectively
in matters of economic or social welfare).
120. Metropolitan Property & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Rhode Island Insurers' Insolvency
Fund, 811 F. Supp. 54, 57 (D.R.I. 1993); see Richardson v. Honolulu, 802 F. Supp.
326, 342 (D. Hawaii 1992) (noting in context of substantive due process analysis that
"courts should give substantial deference to a legislature's determination of a public use
or purpose as well as the legislative means for carrying out the purpose"); In re
Bullington, 80 B.R. 590, 592 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1987) ("'It is by now well established
that legislative acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life [such as the
Bankruptcy Code] come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality, and that the
burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to establish that the legislature
has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way.'") (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining
Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)), aff'd sub nom. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Bullington, 89 B.R.
1010 (M.D. Ga. 1988), aff'd, 878 F.2d 11th Cir. 1989); cf. FCC v. Beach Communica-
tions, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2101 (1993) ("In areas of social and economic policy, a
statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental
constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the
classification.").
121. See In re Gifford, 688 F.2d at 453 ("[U]nder the bankruptcy clause of the
Constitution, 'Congress may prescribe any regulations concerning discharge in
bankruptcy that are not so grossly unreasonable as to be incompatible with fundamental
law.'") (quoting Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 192 (1902)); In re
Bullington, 80 B.R. at 593 (to same effect); Paden v. G.E.C.C. Consumer Discount Co.
(In re Paden), 10 B.R. 206, 207 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981) (recognizing presumption of
constitutionality with respect to legislation passed pursuant to Bankruptcy Power).
As the Pommerer court concluded in 1981:
It appears ... that we must sit back and recognize that the congressional
power to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies is virtually
supreme, and that this power permeates a broad area which includes more
than simply discharging debts and establishing exemptions. If the financial,
commercial and economic structure of the nation is to be preserved, disruption
of debtor-creditor relationships, within constitutional bounds, must be
[Vol. 44:745
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If Congress intends the discharge provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code" to reach the outer most permissible limits of discharge authorized
by the Bankruptcy Clause, it is clear that the provisions, as applied to future
claims, should survive the rational basis test.'2 As a general matter, the
bankruptcy policies of permitting reorganization, giving debtors a fresh
start, and paying present creditors qualify as legitimate government
objectives. 24 The discharge of future claims upon plan confirmation
rationally relates to these legitimate goals. Moreover, the discharge of future
claims, to the extent that it is coupled with fair representation of future
claimants, rationally relates to the additional, rational goal of providing
monetarily for such claimants. Such discharge preserves going concern value
while affording future claimants the means to participate in the reorganiza-
tion and to share in the debtor's estate. Therefore, the discharge of future
claims survives substantive due process scrutiny.
D. Procedural Due Process
Whether or not the Fifth Amendment substantively limits Congress's
power to allow discharge, courts have presumed-primarily in the context
of discussing the rights of known creditors -that the exercise of the
accepted .... Today, an Act of Congress designed for relief of debtors, in
this debt burdened economy, should not be held to violate the Fifth Amend-
ment, sans a clear and convincing demonstration that the adverse effect upon
substantial private rights greatly outweighs the social benefit.
Thorp Credit & Thrift Co. v. Pommerer (In re Pommerer), 10 B.R. 935, 94849 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 1981).
122. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727, 1141(d)(1)(A), 1228(b)-(c), 1328(b) (1988).
123. Whether Congress in fact intended the discharge provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code to employ the full scope of the Bankruptcy Power is a question in need of an
answer. Our concern, however, is with Congress's constitutional power to exercise the
full scope of the Bankruptcy Power. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. The fact
that Congress has the power to discharge all future claims does not mean that it exercised
that power in the Code as currently drafted. The statutory provisions and legislative
history of Code § 101(5) (definition of "claim") and § 1141 (Chapter 11 discharge),
however, strongly suggest that Congress intended a very broad discharge.
124. Cf. Walters v. Webre (In re Webre), 88 B.R. 242, 246 (Bankr 9th Cir. 1988)
(permitting Chapter 13 debtor to discharge debt for willful and malicious injury; and
noting that doing so provides incentive for debtor to propose Chapter 13 plan rather than
to liquidate).
125. Most courts considering the interrelation between Fifth Amendment due process
and the discharge of debt have done so in the context of deciding whether, and under
what circumstances, a known creditor receives adequate notice in a bankruptcy
proceeding in order for its claim to be discharged. For a discussion of some of these
cases, see generally Nicholas A. Franke, The Code and the Constitution: Fifth
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Bankruptcy Power is conditioned upon affording creditors procedural due
process in the form of reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard. 1
26
Some courts and commentators have also presumed that unknown, but
presumably foreseeable, future claimants are equally entitled to such
procedural due process protections. 127 These presumptions, however, are
not obvious ones. Whether future claimants are constitutionally entitled to
notice and an opportunity to be heard before their claims can be discharged
depends upon: (1) whether a future claim is the kind of property right or
interest that is protected by procedural due process; and if so, (2) the nature
and extent of the procedural protections that are due a claimant before she
may be deprived of her property.'28
Amendment Limits on the Debtor's Discharge in Bankruptcy, 17 PEPP. L. REv. 853, 865
(1990) (discussing application of Fifth Amendment due process standard to bankruptcy
proceedings).
126. See, e.g., City of New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 344 U.S. 293,
297 (1953) (finding that the due process protections of Fifth Amendment entitle creditors
to adequate notice before their claims can be discharged); Waterman S.S. Corp. v.
Aguair (In re Waterman S.S. Corp.), 141 B.R. 552, 557 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("The
due process considerations of the Fifth Amendment ... are given great weight and take
precedence over the discharge provisions of § 1141, in cases where a debtor has
knowledge of claims against it, and fails to inform claimants of the pendency of the
proceedings."), vacated, 157 B.R. 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); see also Spring Valley Farms,
Inc. v. Crow (In re Spring Valley Farms, Inc.), 863 F.2d 832, 834 (11th Cir. 1989);
Broomall Indus. v. Data Design Logic Sys., Inc., 786 F.2d 401, 403 (Fed. Cir. 1986);
Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp. (Conrail), 758 F.2d 936, 944 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985); Reliable Elec. Co. v. Olson Constr. Co., 726 F.2d 620,
623 (10th Cir. 1984); Acevedo v. Van Dom Plastic Mach. Co., 68 B.R. 495, 499
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding that due process requires that debtor notify creditor of
a claim when creditor is unlikely to otherwise know of its existence); Roach v. Edge (In
re Edge), 60 B.R. 690, 691-92 n.1 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986) (stating that procedural
due process rights may impose limits on discharge in bankruptcy).
127. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 46-48; see also Franke, supra note 125, at 868-
70 (assuming potential due process problems with respect to unknown claimants); Bibler,
supra note 18, at 170-01 (arguing that future claimants can never receive constitutionally
adequate notice and thus, can never receive due process in Chapter 11 bankruptcy case
that results in discharge of their claims); Roe, supra note 3, at 900-04 (discussing
economic issues raised by due process/notice analysis with respect to future unknown
claimants; determining that such future claimants can receive procedural due process).
128. Arguably, a future tort claimant's entitlement to notice and an opportunity to be
heard may also depend upon a third, related consideration: whether discharge necessarily
qualifies as a deprivation of the future claim. To the extent that this consideration
implicates a takings analysis, see discussion supra part IV.A. Perhaps a more important
question, however, is whether any alleged deprivation is effected by the bankruptcy court
(i.e., through adjudication) or by the Bankruptcy Code (i.e., through legislation).
Procedural due process requires notice and hearing only in adjudicatory settings and
not with respect to the adoption of general legislation. See Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S.
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E. Procedural Due Process: "Property" of a Different Sort
If future claims qualify as dischargeable claims under the Bankruptcy
Code, 12 9 does it follow that these claims qualify as .property deserving of
procedural due process protection? In answering this question, one again
faces the mutable definition of property: The question "What is property?"
receives a comparative answer depending upon whether the focus of Fifth
Amendment analysis is upon substance, takings, or procedure. As demon-
strated above, in the area of substantive due process, there may be no such
thing as constitutional protection for economic property, at least since the
end of the Lochner era.'30 In the area of unconstitutional takings, property
is generally limited to a subset of traditional common-law property interests
established under state law, which probably does not include future claims
dealt with under the Bankruptcy Power.' Property in the procedural due
process context takes on a third meaning.
While also derived substantially from state law, the concept of property
in the procedural due process context is relatively flexible and expansive.
For purposes of procedural due process, the term "property" "denotes a
broad range of interests secured by 'existing rules or understandings.'" '32
And, according to the Supreme Court, procedurally protected property
interests "may take many forms"'33 or be "intangible.""' Thus, proce-
115, 129-31 (1985) ("The procedural component of the Due Process Clause does not
'impose a constitutional limitation on the power of Congress to make substantive changes
in the law .... ") (quoting Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78-81 (1971)); Mulane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (stating that due
process requires that deprivation of property by adjudication "be preceded by notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case"); Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v.
State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) ("General statutes ... are passed
that affect the person or property of individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin, without
giving them a chance to be heard. Their rights are protected in the only way that they
can be in a complex society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those who make
the rule."); see also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432-33 (1982)
(noting that neither state grant of tort immunity to government officials nor state
legislative adjustment of welfare benefits to recipients deprives affected parties of
property without due process); Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 534-36 (1982)
(distinguishing adjudication from legislation and noting "it has never been suggested that
each citizen must in some way be given specific notice of the impact of a new statute on
his property before that law may affect his property rights").
129. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
130. See discussion supra part IV.C.
131. See discussion supra part IV.A.1.
132. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) (quoting Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)); see Jackson v. Department of Public Safety, 675 F.
Supp. 1025, 1029 (M.D. La. 1985).
133. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972).
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dural due process protects interests not otherwise protectable by substantive
due process or takings analyses. 3 5 At the most basic level, this heightened
procedural protection makes sense: Extra care with respect to procedural
protection arguably ensures that an interest which may or may not qualify
as property for other purposes is not destroyed before it has been examined.
The language of some decisions suggests that the present right to bring
a cause of action in tort, although perhaps not property for other purposes,
nevertheless qualifies for procedural due process protection. 6 As in a
takings analysis, however, in order for procedural due process to be
constitutionally mandated, the interest at issue must be one derived from a
source independent of the Constitution, such as state or federal law,' 37 and
one in which the claimant "has already acquired . . . specific benefits."'
A mere subjective expectancy is not protected. '3 9
134. See Tulsa Professional Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478,485 (1988)
(determining for procedural due process purposes that cause of action against an estate
for unpaid bill-an "intangible interest"-qualified as protectable property); see also J.B.
Ranch, Inc. v. Grand County, 958 F.2d 306, 309 (10th Cir. 1992) ("'There are many
intangible rights that merit the protection of procedural due process although their
infringement falls short of an exercise of the power of eminent domain for which just
compensation is required under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.'") (quoting
Landmark Land Co. of Okla., Inc. v. Buchanan, 874 F.2d 717, 723 (10th Cir. 1989)).
135. One bankruptcy court has noted that "Itihe gradual demise of substantive due
process has been accompanied by an enlargement of what is considered property" in the
Fifth Amendment procedural due process context. Thorp Credit & Thrift Co. v.
Pommerer (In re Pommerer), 10 B.R. 935, 948 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981) (citing Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)). Nevertheless, as other courts have noted, this
expansive concept of property does not transform every interest accorded by state law
into property. See, e.g., Jackson, 675 F. Supp. at 1030.
136. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985) (holding,
in class action, that a "chose in action" qualifies as a constitutionally recognized property
interest for purposes of procedural due process); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455
U.S. 422, 428 n.4 (1982) (concluding that, although not traditional property right and
thus not subject to takings analysis, state tort-law claim is species of property protected
by procedural due process); A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 944, 1014 (4th Cir.)
(accepting, for purposes of procedural due process/change of venue analysis, that tort
claim is "'species of property' in the constitutional sense"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 876
(1986); Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 972-73 (5th Cir. 1983) (recognizing wrongful
death action as property for procedural due process purposes because state law defined
such action as property right); Jackson, 675 F. Supp. at 1029-30 (noting that Mullane
court found cause of action to be protectable property for procedural due process
purposes).
137. See Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 222-23 (1985).
138. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 (1972).
139. Id. at 577 ("To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have
more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral
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Whether a future claim fits these requirements is a matter of debate.
Arguably, at the time of discharge, the future claimant does not have an
already acquired interest in specific benefits under most state laws because
the cause of action has not yet accrued. 40 Federal bankruptcy law may
nevertheless supply an independent source of legitimate expectation for the
future claimant: If future claims are cognizable and dischargeable under the
Bankruptcy Code, then they may be estimated and paid under the Code.'41
Thus bootstrapped by the Bankruptcy Code itself, a future claim would
qualify as property subject to procedural constitutional protection.
F. Procedural Due Process: What Process is Due?
In the bankruptcy context, procedural due process seeks to ensure a
creditor's meaningful participation in proceedings that could affect its
interests. The standard for providing procedural due process to creditors in
a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case is derived from the standard applied in other
judicial proceedings and set forth by the Supreme Court in Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. :142 When practicable, interested parties
are to receive notice "reasonably calculated . . . to apprise [them] of the
pendency of [an] action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections."' Essentially, procedural due process intends that a party
receive both notice and an opportunity to be heard.
1. Notice
The procedural process owed to unknown or unidentifiable future
claimants does not include actual notice under all circumstances. InMullane,
the Court approved notice by publication where unknown trust beneficiaries
and their interests "could not with due diligence be ascertained." 14
Outside the mass tort context, courts have thus approved publication notice
where unknown creditors or their interests have not been reasonably
expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.").
140. See discussion supra part IV.A.1.
141. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(c)(1) (1988).
142. 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950) (discussing procedural protections due under
Fourteenth Amendment). Due process challenges to federal legislation are grounded in
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, while the same type of challenges to
state legislation are grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Because judicial decisions interpreting either clause are relevant for purposes of this
Article, cf. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 702 n.3 (1976), we make no distinction
between Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment cases.
143. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
144. Id. at 317.
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ascertainable.1 45 Moreover, according to the Supreme Court, "in the case
of persons missing or unknown, employment of an indirect and even a
probably futile means of notification is all that the situation permits," and
such an indirect method "creates no constitutional bar to a final decree
foreclosing their rights." 46 Bankruptcy courts have similarly recognized
that a debtor cannot be required to search out each conceivable, possible,
conjectural, or speculative creditor in order to give actual notice of a claims
bar date.
47
Under the language of Mullane, however, due process with respect to
most future claimants cannot be ensured through publication notice alone
because publication notice is not "all that the situation permits."148 In the
mass tort/future claims context, unlike other cases in which particular
creditors or their interests may not be reasonably ascertainable, the future
claims as a group are usually in some general sense known and foreseeable
to the debtor.'49 It is the number, extent, and specifics of the future claims
that are unknown. When the debtor possesses general knowledge about a
group of likely future claims-especially when future claimants may not
145. See Tulsa Professional Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 490
(1988); see also City of New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 344 U.S. 293, 296
(1953) (permitting publication notice to unknown claimants); In re Best Prods. Co., 140
B.R. 353, 359 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (permitting publication notice to unknown
products liability claimants); In re Production Plating, Inc., 90 B.R. 277,284-85 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 1988) (permitting publication notice to unknown holders of intentional tort,
contribution, and indemnity claims).
146. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317. Where conditions do not reasonably permit actual
notice, constructive notice is constitutionally adequate if "the form chosen is not
substantially less likely to bring home notice than other of the feasible and customary
substitutes." Id. at 315; see Vancouver Women's Health Collective Soc'y v. A.H. Robins
Co., 820 F.2d 1359, 1364 (4th Cir. 1987) ("Where conditions do not reasonably permit
a more adequate notice, the form of notice chosen must not be substantially less likely
to bring home notice than other feasible and customary substitutes.").
147. See, e.g., Charter Crude Oil Co. v. Petroleos Mexicanos (In re Charter Co.),
125 B.R. 650, 655 (M.D. Fla. 1991); In re Thomson McKinnon Sec., Inc., 130 B.R.
717,720 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991); Brooks Fashion Stores, Inc. v. Michigan Employment
Sec. Comm'n (In re Brooks Fashion Stores), 124 B.R. 436, 444 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1991).
148. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317.
149. See Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Aguiar (In re Waterman S.S. Corp.), 141 B.R. 552,
557 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("[A]mple evidence existed for [debtor] to conclude that
an amorphous class of unmanifested asbestosis claimants ... existed at the time [it] filed
its bankruptcy petition."), vacated, 157 B.R. 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); infra note 18 and
accompanying text; see also Roe, supra note 3, at 902; cf. Schweitzer v. Consolidated
Rail Corp. (Conrail), 758 F.2d 936, 944 (3d Cir.) (under former Bankruptcy Act), cert.
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even be aware of their exposure to an offending product-publication notice
by itself does not suffice.5 0 Rather, the practical situation in a bankruptcy
case usually also permits (and therefore Mullane usually mandates) the
appointment of a future claims representative in order to provide future
claims access to a court hearing. In fact, a debtor's failure to seek such
appointment has recently been characterized by one court as an attempt to
"write out of the Code its estimation provision.""' The practicality
mandate of Mullane therefore usually requires the opportunity for future
claimants to be heard through a representative when publication notice to
them is largely futile.
2. Hearing
The procedural due process analysis does not end with the determina-
tion that publication notice is, by itself, defective as to future claimants
whose claims can be generally fixed and defned. 52 In Mullane, the
Supreme Court required courts to have "due regard for the practicalities of
the case" when determining how to satisfy procedural due process.'53 In
150. In this context, publication notice arguably functions only as an unacceptable,
"emaciated form of minimal due process," where even well-read claimants may remain
completely unaware that their substantive rights are being affected by the bankruptcy. In
re Waterman S.S. Corp., 141 B.R. at 558 (finding publication notice constitutionally
insufficient as to debtor's former employees who were future asbestosis claimants at the
time of the bankruptcy). Although arguably futile publication notice does not necessarily
offend procedural due process in other circumstances, it does so here because it does not
qualify as "all that the situation permits." See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317.
151. In re Waterman S.S. Corp., 141 B.R. at 558. An examination of the Waterman
Steamship decision reveals the court's distress over two circumstances: First, the court
noted the debtor's failure to list on its schedules all of its known former employees; and
second, the court noted the debtor's failure to seek the appointment of a future claims
representative. Id. at 558. By failing to take either of these actions, the debtor effectively
prevented former employees who were future asbestos claimants from participating in the
reorganization process. Moreover, because the debtor had, in fact, already been
negotiating with another group of former employees whose injuries had manifested by
the time of the bankruptcy, see id., the debtor seemed to demonstrate an almost
deliberate indifference to the plight of its future claimants. Thus, despite having
determined that the employees' future claims resulting from prebankruptcy asbestos
exposure fit within the Bankruptcy Code's definition of "claim," see id. at 558-59, the
court found that the former employees' claims had not been discharged, see id.
Presumably, if the claimants had received actual notice, or if a future claims representa-
tive had been appointed, the court would have discharged the future claims.
152. Contra Bibler, supra note 18, at 168-75.
153. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314; see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481
(1972) (stating that due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protection as
particular situation demands); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971)
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essence, Mullane requires the best protective procedure that is practicable
under the circumstances. 
1 54
In Mathews v. Eldridge,'55 the Supreme Court established a fact-based
balancing standard by which courts are to determine what process is
constitutionally required. Under this standard, courts are to consider three
primary elements:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would en-
tail 156
These practicability and balancing standards are welcome friends in the
bankruptcy arena where courts are frequently guided by the inherently
(acknowledging that formal and procedural requisites for hearing can vary depending
upon importance of interests involved and nature of the subsequent proceedings).
154. See Tulsa Professional Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 490
(1988); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Schutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985); City of New York
v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 344 U.S. 293, 296 (1953); Standard Oil Co. v. New
Jersey ex rel. Parsons, 341 U.S. 428 (1951); Weigner v. City of New York, 852 F.2d
646, 649 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1005 (1989); Sheftelman v. Standard
Metals Corp., 839 F.2d 1383, 1386 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 881
(1988); Charter Int'l Oil Co. v. Ziegler (In re Charter Co.), 113 B.R. 725 (M.D. Fla.
1990); In re Best Prods. Co., 140 B.R. 353 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Eagle-Picher
Indus., 137 B.R. 679 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992); In re Production Plating, Inc., 90 B.R.
277 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988); In re Waterman S.S. Corp., 59 B.R. 724, 727 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1986).
155. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
156. Id. at 335. The cases applying the Mathews due process balancing test are
numerous. See, e.g., Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305,
320-34 (1985); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755-70 (1982); Lassiter v.
Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27-33 (1981); Propert v. District of
Columbia, 948 F.2d 1327, 1332-35 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Berg v. Shearer, 755 F.2d 1343,
1346-47 (8th Cir. 1985); Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 739 F. Supp. 814, 836-
43 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Crocker v. Fluvanna County (VA) Bd. of Public Welfare, 676 F.
Supp. 711,716-17 (W.D. Va. 1987), aft'd, 859 F.2d 14 (4th Cir. 1988); Myers v. Scott
County (In re Scott County Master Docket), 672 F. Supp. 1152, 1169-71 (D. Minn.
1987), aff'd, 868 F.2d 1017 (8th Cir. 1989); Bradford v. Edelstein, 467 F. Supp. 1361,
1373-75 (S.D. Tex. 1979). Although the cases generally balance the three factors to
determine what kind of hearing due process requires, the factors are equally relevant in
determining what type of notice is required.
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equitable framework of the Bankruptcy Code.157 When applied to the
discharge of most future claims, these standards make clear that publication
notice should be coupled with the appointment of a future claims representa-
tive in order to provide future claimants with an opportunity to participate
in the case through the representative.
Under the tests of practicability and balancing, procedural due process
protections may not be permitted to defeat the substantive rights of all other
parties or substantially to waste the distributable value of the estate through
delay or otherwise. 58 A court's temptation -flatly to prohibit the discharge
of future claims in the name of due process is inimical to the interests of
present creditors, including present tort claimants, 59 and may actually
harm the interests of future claimants as well. The interest of future
claimants in preserving their claims against the reorganized debtor must be
balanced with the interests of the troubled debtor's other creditors. This
statement holds all the more true when the so-called procedural protections
have the potential to destroy both the procedural and substantive rights of
the future claimants themselves: Failure to discharge future claims may
trigger liquidation and entirely defeat recovery for future claimants." 6
157. See Roe, supra note 3, at 901-02; Hardiman, supra note 18, at 1377-80.
158. See Vancouver Women's Health Collective Soc'y v. A.H. Robins Co., 820 F.2d
1359, 1364 (4th Cir. 1987) ("[C]ourt must balance the needs of notification of potential
claimants with the interest of existing creditors and claimants ... and use discretion in
balancing these interests when deciding how much to spend on notification.").
159. As Professor David Carlson points out in his discussion of successor liability
issues in bankruptcy, a court's failure to discharge future personal injury claims causes
a temporal inequality among claimants. See David G. Carlson, Successor Liability in
Bankruptcy: Some Unifying Themes of Intertemporal Creditor Priorities Created by
Running Covenants, Products Liability, and Toxic-Waste Cleanup, 50 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 119 (1987). The temporal inequality results from the following: First, the failure
to discharge future claims lessens the value of the debtor's estate to a potential purchaser,
which, in turn, lessens the distribution to present claimants. Second, and more important,
present claimants who receive pro rata shares in the diminished estate arguably subsidize
100% of the nondischarged future claims. See id. at 127-31. For example, at the most
simplistic level, if a company has $20,000 in future liabilities and would otherwise be
valued at $100,000, a buyer would be willing to pay $80,000 for the company. Present
claimants (including present tort claimants) would then receive their pro rata share of the
$80,000, which is unlikely to cover 100% of their claims. Future claimants, however,
will retain the right to recover,100% of their claims from the successor entity. Id. at 128.
160. See Keene Corp. v. Fiorelli (In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.), _ F.3d
-, 1993 WL 497538 (2d Cir. Dec. 1, 1993); see also Roe, supra note 3, at 901
("Surely due process cannot deny the assertion in bankruptcy of a future claim in the face
of a serious risk that little or nothing will be left to satisfy the claim when it is eventually
reduced to judgment. Due process cannot be so ironically self-defeating."); Hardiman,
supra note 18, at 1380-82; BIENENSTOCK, supra note 57, at 692 ("Paradoxically, the
alternative to providing future claimants with modified due process through the use of
1993]
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Under the tests of practicability and balancing, the appointment of a future
claims representative along with a reasonably calculated publication notice,
emerges as a rational, practicable, and constitutionally permissible basis for
the discharge of future claims.' 6
V. CONCLUSION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL DISCHARGE OF
FUTURE CLAIMS
A. A.H. Robins, Manville, and Their Like
The constitutionality of future claims discharge is supported both by the
breadth of the Bankruptcy Clause 62 and by the absence of either substan-
tive Fifth Amendment prohibitions on Congress's authority to exercise the
full scope of the Bankruptcy Power discharge 63 or Supreme Court
precedent prohibiting the discharge of unsecured, contingent claims in
appropriate circumstances. The Fifth Amendment's procedural due process
standards, moreover, do not preclude the discharge of future claims. Rather,
they require only that a debtor undertake the best practicable efforts to give
notice to future claimants and afford them a meaningful opportunity to be
heard."' 4 These procedural requirements are best met through the use of
reasonably calculated notice and the appointment of a future claims
representative. '6
a present representative is that they may receive no process. That predicament may itself
justify utilization of a present representative of future claimants.").
161. Although the procedure described may be adequate in the bankruptcy context, it
may not suffice in all other contexts. For example, the outcome of the Mathews
balancing test is not necessarily the same when considering the adequacy of procedures
to bar future claims based on a class action settlement as when considering the adequacy
of procedures to discharge future claims in bankruptcy. Although the interests of a future
claimant are likely to be similar in either setting, the government interests are of different
weight. The substantive public policy considerations that favor discharging debts against
reorganizing debtors and the specific constitutional grant of power to Congress to enact
bankruptcy legislation weigh heavier than the mostly procedural policies supporting the
class action rule. (The latter procedural policies are, after all, instituted merely to
provide a convenient alternative manner of conducting litigation.) For this reason, in the
balance, procedural due process that is constitutionally sufficient to discharge future
claims in bankruptcy may be insufficient to bind future claimants to a class action
settlement. Cf. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 176 (1974) (holding that due
process and FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) required individually mailed notice to 2,250,000
class members whose names and addresses were easily ascertainable).
162. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
163. See discussion supra Part IV.
164. See supra part IV.F.
165. See supra part IV.F.
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The constitutional permissibility of discharging future claims may best
be grasped through an understanding of the relationship between the
Bankruptcy Power and the procedural requirements of the Due Process
Clause. Procedural due process was not intended to bar substantively valid
legislative enactments. "' Procedural due process cannot therefore serve
to prohibit the discharge of future claims pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code.
To hold otherwise would, in effect, elevate the economic interest in bringing
a future tort action to the level of a sacrosanct fundamental right. Thus, the
A.H. Robins 67 and Manville'6 s courts constitutionally ordered the de
facto discharge of future claims following notice and representation that
were imperfect, but consistent with legitimate bankruptcy objectives and
practicalities.
To the extent that courts remain ambivalent about appointing future
claims representatives 69 and discharging future claims, their ambivalence
should be based upon unclear statutory intent or, more persuasively, the
obvious absence of clear statutory procedures for ensuring future claimants
due process. It is this lack of clarity that has caused courts to agonize over
the type of hearing to be afforded future claimants, 7 ' the necessarily
imperfect knowledge possessed by a future claims representative,1
71
whether analogies should be drawn to class action procedures,17 the
propriety of filing group claims, 73 the questions related to voting and
166. See supra note 128.
167. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing H.K. Porter case).
170. As one bankruptcy court has recently observed, "Unless a person is adequately
informed of the reasons for denial of a legal interest, a hearing serves no purpose-and
resembles more a scene from Kafka than a constitutional process." Pettibone Corp. v.
Payne (In re Pettibone Corp.), 151 B.R. 166, 172 (Bankr. N.D. Il. 1993); see In re
Walker, 149 B.R. 511, 514 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992) (citing Chicago Cable Communica-
tions v. Chicago Cable Commission, 879 F.2d 1540, 1546 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1044 (1990)).
171. Courts such as the National Gypsum court obviously fear that, despite the general
identifiability of the interests of a group of future claimants, injured parties will unfairly
go without compensation if an established trust runs out of money in the future due to
improper estimation. See In re National Gypsum, No. 390-37213-SAF-1 1, slip op. at 33
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 1993) (declining to issue a permanent injunction barring
future claims against reorganized debtor; stating that "In]on-Bankruptcy Code claimants
must be able to pursue their remedies in the future after the exhaustion of the ... trust
[established through the reorganization plan]").
172. See supra note 161.
173. See Reid v. White Motor Corp., 886 F.2d 1462, 1469 (6th Cir. 1989) (permitting
class proof of claim), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1080 (1990); Certified Class in Charter See.
Litig. v.Charter Co. (In re Charter Co.), 876 F.2d 866, 871 (11th Cir. 1989), cert.
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cramdown standards for future claims, and the propriety of enjoining or
discharging future claims.' 74 In sum, although the Constitution and the
apparent statutory intent of the Code drafters 75 allow the discharge of
future claims, the statute omits the roadmap.
B. Unforeseen Future Claims
Some future claims are so contingent and so remote at the time of the
bankruptcy case as to be wholly uncontemplated by the debtor, the
claimholders, and perhaps by the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code. 176 This
category of future claims might exist, for example, against a manufacturer
that, at the time of its bankruptcy filing, could not foresee the discovery by
scientists ten years later of a latent causal link between the use of a
particular product the company manufactured prepetition and cancer.
177
Notwithstanding the remoteness and degree of speculation involved, these
claims, based upon the prepetition manufacture of the later-revealed
dismissed, 496 U.S. 944 (1990); In re American Reserve Corp., 840 F.2d 487, 492 (7th
Cir. 1988); Sheftelman v. Standard Metals Corp. (In re Standard Metals Corp.), 817
F.2d 625, 631-32 (10th Cir.) (disallowing class proof of claim), vacated and rev'd in
part on other grounds, 839 F.2d 1383 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 881
(1988); In re Energy Resources Co., 82 B.R. 172 (D. Mass. 1987) (same); In re Vestra
Indus., 82 B.R. 21 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1987) (same).
174. See discussion supra Part H1.
175. See note 17 and accompanying text.
176. But see supra note 17 and accompanying text.
177. The category of future claims described here is more remote than the type
contemplated by Judge Newman of the Second Circuit in the Chateaugay case:
Consider, for example, a company that builds bridges around the world. It
can estimate that of 10,000 bridges it builds, one will fail, causing 10 deaths.
Having built 10,000 bridges, it becomes insolvent and files a petition in
bankruptcy. Is there a "claim" on behalf of the 10 people who will be killed
when they drive across the one bridge that will fail someday in the future?
United States v. LTV (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 944 F.2d 997, 1003 (2d Cir. 1991). In
Judge Newman's hypothetical, at least the existence and nature of a limited group of
possible future claims was foreseeable and estimable at the time of the bankruptcy
proceeding and, therefore, arguably susceptible of due process and discharge.
With respect to the type of remote future claims described by Judge Newman, one
Miami bankruptcy judge has recently suggested that representation for the potential future
claimants may be necessary. In the pending Piper Aircraft case, Judge Robert Mark
ordered the debtor and the unsecured creditors committee to find an agreeable party to
represent persons not yet injured in potential Piper Aircraft-related accidents. Judge Mark
indicated, moreover, that any approved bidder for the debtor's assets will be required to
help insulate the reorganized Piper from future lawsuits-most likely through contribu-
tions to a trust fund. See David Lyons, Future Suit Protection: Piper Deal Comes with
a Catch, NAT'L L.J., May 17, 1993, at 3.
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carcinogenic product, meet our working definition of future claims178 and
may well meet the statutory definition of claims. 1
79
The policy impetus for discharging these wholly unforeseen future
claims, however, is weaker.' It is true that, absent their discharge, and
if the debtor company has successfully reorganized, unforeseen future claims
may be paid in full when they manifest themselves, while present and
conventional future claims may have been substantially compromised in the
previous bankruptcy. But because they are unforeseen, these future claims,
unlike future claims such as those foreseen by A.H. Robins and Manville,
do not depress the going concern value of the company at the time of its
reorganization. Therefore, the failure to discharge them does not directly tax
the bankruptcy distribution to conventional claims.'
Irrespective of the wisdom of doing so, Congress may provide for the
discharge of unforeseen future claims if their discharge is rationally related
to a proper purpose." z Under current precedents, one may argue that the
Bankruptcy Code already allows for the discharge of unforeseen future
claims.' 83 Moreover, it is well possible to fashion an argument that
unforeseen future claims can be discharged within the prescriptions of due
process. Under Mullane, publication notice, although futile, may suffice
because due process requires only the best notice and opportunity for
hearing that can reasonably be given under the circumstances.
84
Even under the Mathews balancing test,8 5 the discharge of unforeseen
future claims appears constitutionally permissible. The governmental interest
in discharging them appears slight 86 because unforeseen future claims do
not interfere with reorganization; 87 and the risk of erroneous deprivation
may be high because the private interest of unforeseen future claimants may
178. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 158-160 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
182. Because there are no substantive constitutional limits (other than the rational
relation test) on Congress's ability to provide for the discharge of future tort claims, see
discussion supra part IV.A. (with respect to takings) and part IV.C. (with respect to
substantive due process), the only other relevant constitutional inquiry would be whether
these claimants were afforded sufficient procedural protections at the time their claims
were discharged.
183. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
184. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317-18 (1950).
185. See supra notes 155-161 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Doehr, 111 S. Ct. 2105, 2115 (1991). InDoehr, the
Court broadened the Mathews test to include consideration of the interest of the party
seeking the deprivation along with the governmental interest. Id. at 2112.
187. See supra notes 158-161 and accompanying text.
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be substantial' 8 though yet undiscovered. Nevertheless, the value of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards is low if not totally ab-
sent.' 89 The appointment of an unforeseen future claims representative, for
instance, would be virtually meaningless. Thus, even under Mathews, unless
other practicable and meaningful procedural safeguards are available, a court
might validate virtually futile publication notice to unforeseen future
claimants and order their discharge.'19 Notwithstanding the constitutional
permissibility of discharging unforeseen future claims, however, Congress
has left the courts to struggle with statutory inference' 9' and to risk
allegations of moral bankruptcy in the struggle.' 92
C. Statutory Reform
This Article has largely avoided the much-mooted question of whether
the Bankruptcy Code already provides for future claims. Regardless of the
answer to that question, new and explicit statutory provisions are advisable
in order to assure the constitutional and consistent treatment of future
claims. In addition, such provisions would ensure that Congress intends (if
it does) the discharge of future claims as part of the exercise of its
Bankruptcy Power-an intention that has its own constitutional signifi-
cance.'" Of the present statutory proposals,' 94 those of the National
188. See, e.g., Doehr, 111 S. Ct. at 2112-13.
189. See, e.g., id. at 2114.
190. Although not addressing unforeseen claims per se, some courts have held that due
process is not offended by publication notice alone in the case of claims unknown to the
debtor. See Charter Crude Oil Co. v. Petroleos Mexicanos (In re Charter Co.), 125 B.R.
650, 655 (M.D. Fla. 1991); Charter Int'l Oil Co. v. Ziegler (In re Charter Co.), 113
B.R. 725,727 (M.D. Fla. 1990); In re Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 112 B.R. 920,
924 (N.D. Ill. 1990); GreatAmerican Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Adcock Excavating,
Inc., No. 89C3794, 1990 WL 51219, *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 1990); Wright v. Placid Oil
Co., 107 B.R. 104 (N.D. Tex. 1989); In re Best Prods. Co., 140 B.R. 353, 359 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1992); Brooks Fashion Stores, Inc. v. Michigan Employment Sec. Comm'n
(In re Brooks Fashion Stores, Inc.), 124 B.R. 436,444 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991). But see
Pettibone Corp. v. Payne (In re Pettibone Corp.), 151 B.R. 166, 172 (Bankr. N.D. Il1.
1993); In re Eagle-Picher Indus., 137 B.R. 679, 682 (Bankr S.D. Ohio 1992).
191. A clear statutory statement respecting the discharge of unforeseen future claims
would, of itself, advance the argument of constitutionality. See supra note 123 and
accompanying text and supra note 128.
192. In light of weak supporting policy, and in the absence of sympathetic facts, the
discharge of unforeseen future mass tort claims seems unduly harsh. Existing precedent
and statutory language, particularly in the face of what may prove to be complicated
factual circumstances in the future, leave the question of their discharge unresolved.
193. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 12.
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Bankruptcy Conference provide a procedural roadmap for the discharge of
future claims, are consistent with the conclusions of this Article, and are
unlikely to disturb the general fabric of the Bankruptcy Code.'95
195. See NAT'L BANKR. CONF. CODE REV. PROJECT, supra note 12, at 273-80.
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